whoop-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.0.12
Published by rajdeepmondaldotcom — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Ask Claude or ChatGPT about your WHOOP data. Recovery, sleep, strain, and workout analysis computed from your own records.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`mcpb/server/main.py:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: __main__": sys.exit(subprocess.run(["uvx", "whoop-mcp-server", "serve"]).returncode)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcpb/server/main.py
In the server's implementation (`src/whoop_mcp/cli.py:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: turn False result = subprocess.run(["pgrep", "-x", "Claude"], capture_output=True) return result.returncode == 0
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/whoop_mcp/cli.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetchingests untrusted inputcompare_periodsno sensitive capabilityget_activity_mappingno sensitive capabilityget_connection_statusno sensitive capabilityget_correlationsno sensitive capabilityget_cycleno sensitive capabilityget_cyclesno sensitive capabilityget_daily_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_health_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_personal_recordsno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_recoveriesno sensitive capabilityget_recovery_trendsno sensitive capabilityget_sleepno sensitive capabilityget_sleep_streamno sensitive capabilityget_sleep_trendsno sensitive capabilityget_sleepsno sensitive capabilityget_strain_trendsno sensitive capabilityget_weekly_reportno sensitive capabilityget_workoutno sensitive capabilityget_workoutsno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.12 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan whoop-mcp-server --online --registry pypi
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