whoop-mcp-server
npm
v0.0.5
Published by tiiwoo — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the WHOOP Developer Platform API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/cli-auth.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const cmd = process.platform === "darwin" ? "open"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/cli-auth.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/cli-auth.js:24`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : "xdg-open"; exec(`${cmd} "${authUrl}"`); } catch { // User can open manually } await
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth/cli-auth.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
compare_recovery_and_sleepno sensitive capabilityget_body_measurementsno sensitive capabilityget_cycleno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_recent_health_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_recovery_for_cycleno sensitive capabilityget_sleepno sensitive capabilityget_sleep_for_cycleno sensitive capabilityget_sleep_performance_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_today_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_training_load_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_workoutno sensitive capabilitylist_cyclesno sensitive capabilitylist_recoveriesno sensitive capabilitylist_sleepsno sensitive capabilitylist_workoutsno sensitive capabilityrevoke_oauth_accessno sensitive capabilitywhoop_authenticateno sensitive capabilitywhoop_check_authno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.5 latest |
B 87/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan whoop-mcp-server --online
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