Mund — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@weave_protocol/mund",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@weave_protocol/mund"
},
"server": {
"name": "@weave_protocol/mund"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 76,
"threatScore": 82,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 2.4,
"exfiltration": 15.4,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-CMD-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SECRET-1",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SECRET-1",
"title": "Embedded AWS access key id in description",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "A live-looking AWS access key id is embedded in the description of tool \"mund_scan_content\". Hardcoded credentials in server metadata leak to every client that lists this server.",
"remediation": "Remove the credential and rotate it; never ship secrets in tool metadata.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "mund_scan_content",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "aws-access-key",
"staticProvenanceCap": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.js:65`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.js"
},
"evidence": "' }, { pattern: /\\b(child_process|subprocess|system\\(|popen)\\b/i, capability: 'execution', risk: 'Process spawning'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.js",
"line": 65,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/constants.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/constants.js:403`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/constants.js"
},
"evidence": "pattern: '(?i)(child_process\\\\.exec|os\\\\.system|subprocess\\\\.call|eval\\\\(|exec\\\\().*\\\\$|.*\\\\{.*\\\\}', se",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/constants.js",
"line": 403,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.ts:146`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.ts"
},
"evidence": "on' }, { pattern: /\\b(child_process|subprocess|system\\(|popen)\\b/i, capability: 'execution', risk: 'Process spawning'",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.ts",
"line": 146,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/constants.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/constants.ts:416`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/constants.ts"
},
"evidence": "rn', pattern: '(?i)(child_process\\\\.exec|os\\\\.system|subprocess\\\\.call|eval\\\\(|exec\\\\().*\\\\$|.*\\\\{.*\\\\}', severi",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/constants.ts",
"line": 416,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"title": "Instruction-override directive",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Instruction-override directive detected in the description of tool \"mund_scan_content\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "mund_scan_content",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "ignore previous instructions",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "override"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-CMD-1",
"title": "Shell command embedded in tool metadata",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Shell command embedded in tool metadata detected in the description of tool \"mund_validate_command\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "mund_validate_command",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "rm -rf",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "command-in-prose"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "mund_add_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_remove_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_list_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_acknowledge_alert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_block_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_allowlist_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_configure_notification",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "mund_scan_mcp_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_check_typosquatting",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_audit_mcp_permissions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_scan_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_check_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_validate_command",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_get_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mund_get_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "4853b5ae85fda0a06769848153a8312657b85999abadb412379a67b997267a2e",
"stats": {
"tools": 15,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}