Mund MCP Server
@weave_protocol/mund
npm
v0.2.3
Source verified
Published by tyox-all — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The Guardian Protocol - MCP-based security monitoring for agentic AI systems
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 17.8 = 82. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Embedded AWS access key id in description MTC-INJ-SECRET-1 | exfiltration |
| −1.2 | Instruction-override directive MTC-INJ-AUTH-2 | injection |
| −1.2 | Shell command embedded in tool metadata MTC-INJ-CMD-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 82 − 6 = 76. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Embedded AWS access key id in descriptionMTC-INJ-SECRET-1
A live-looking AWS access key id is embedded in the description of tool "mund_scan_content". Hardcoded credentials in server metadata leak to every client that lists this server.
Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the credential and rotate it; never ship secrets in tool metadata.
Location: tool mund_scan_content · description
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.js:65`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ' }, { pattern: /\b(child_process|subprocess|system\(|popen)\b/i, capability: 'execution', risk: 'Process spawning'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/constants.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/constants.js:403`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pattern: '(?i)(child_process\\.exec|os\\.system|subprocess\\.call|eval\\(|exec\\().*\\$|.*\\{.*\\}', se
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/constants.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.ts:146`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: on' }, { pattern: /\b(child_process|subprocess|system\(|popen)\b/i, capability: 'execution', risk: 'Process spawning'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/analyzers/mcp-server-analyzer.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/constants.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/constants.ts:416`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rn', pattern: '(?i)(child_process\\.exec|os\\.system|subprocess\\.call|eval\\(|exec\\().*\\$|.*\\{.*\\}', severi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/constants.ts
low Instruction-override directiveMTC-INJ-AUTH-2
Instruction-override directive detected in the description of tool "mund_scan_content". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: ignore previous instructions
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool mund_scan_content · description
low Shell command embedded in tool metadataMTC-INJ-CMD-1
Shell command embedded in tool metadata detected in the description of tool "mund_validate_command". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: rm -rf
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool mund_validate_command · description
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mund_configure_notificationnetwork egressmund_acknowledge_alertno sensitive capabilitymund_add_ruleno sensitive capabilitymund_allowlist_patternno sensitive capabilitymund_audit_mcp_permissionsno sensitive capabilitymund_block_patternno sensitive capabilitymund_check_typosquattingno sensitive capabilitymund_check_urlno sensitive capabilitymund_get_eventsno sensitive capabilitymund_get_statusno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
mund_list_rulesno sensitive capabilitymund_remove_ruleno sensitive capabilitymund_scan_contentno sensitive capabilitymund_scan_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilitymund_validate_commandno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.3 latest |
C 76/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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