GitLab — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@wanadev/mcp-gitlab",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@wanadev/mcp-gitlab"
},
"server": {
"name": "@wanadev/mcp-gitlab"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"file-write",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (101 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([list_repository_tree]) and tools that can send data out ([create_issue, upload_file]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "list_repository_tree → create_issue"
},
"evidence": "sources [list_repository_tree] → sinks [create_issue, upload_file]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"list_repository_tree"
],
"sinks": [
"create_issue",
"upload_file"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:110`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${name}/latest`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3_0",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 110,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"create_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"create_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"unlink_work_items\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_work_items\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"unlink\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_work_items"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"create_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"unlink_work_items\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_work_items\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_work_items"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"list_repository_tree\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"list_repository_tree\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "list_repository_tree",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_path\" on \"create_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_path\" on \"delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"list_repository_tree"
],
"externalSink": [
"create_issue",
"upload_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"list_repository_tree",
"create_issue"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: list_repository_tree → create_issue."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "gitlab_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_pipelines",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_job_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "retry_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_pipeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_branches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_repository_tree",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_protected_branches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "protect_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unprotect_branch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"create_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "commit_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_commits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_epics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reopen_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_epic_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_issue_to_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_epic_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_epic_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_epic_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_epic_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_epic_widgets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_epic_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_epic_health_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_issue_health_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_epic_iteration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_work_item_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_work_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unlink_work_items",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"unlink\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "add_linked_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_issue",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reopen_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_project_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_issue_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_issue_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_issue_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_issue_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_merge_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_merge_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_merge_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_merge_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_merge_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "approve_merge_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rebase_merge_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_mr_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_mr_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_mr_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_mr_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_mr_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_mr_approval_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_mr_approval_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_mr_approval_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_mr_approval_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_mr_discussion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_mr_discussion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_milestones",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_project_milestones",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_project_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_project_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_project_milestone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_group_members",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_boards",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_iterations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_iteration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_iteration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_work_item_type_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_workitem_statuses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_group_member",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_project_member",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_member_access_level",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_member",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_merge_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_blobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_current_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "dd2bcba3cacc8666d750c7b05649dfc3fd4273fe6091c0a24f88b5ee6bee1733",
"stats": {
"tools": 101,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 4,
"low": 6,
"info": 0
}
}
}