GitLab (wanadev) MCP Server
@wanadev/mcp-gitlab
npm
v1.8.0
Source verified
Published by wanadev — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Manages GitLab epics, issues, and milestones.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([list_repository_tree]) and tools that can send data out ([create_issue, upload_file]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [list_repository_tree] → sinks [create_issue, upload_file]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow list_repository_tree → create_issue
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:110`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${name}/latest`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(3_0
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Tool "create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool create_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
medium Tool "unlink_work_items" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "unlink_work_items" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool unlink_work_items
low Mutating tool "create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "unlink_work_items" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "unlink_work_items" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool unlink_work_items
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "list_repository_tree"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_repository_tree" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_repository_tree · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "create_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "create_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool create_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_path" on "delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "delete_file" takes a path parameter "file_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool delete_file · inputSchema.properties.file_path
Tools 101
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_filewrites filescreate_issuenetwork egressdelete_filewrites fileslist_repository_treereads sensitive dataunlink_work_itemswrites filesupload_filenetwork egressadd_epic_noteno sensitive capabilityadd_group_memberno sensitive capabilityadd_issue_noteno sensitive capabilityadd_issue_to_epicno sensitive capability
Show 91 more tools ↓
add_linked_itemno sensitive capabilityadd_mr_noteno sensitive capabilityadd_project_memberno sensitive capabilityapprove_merge_requestno sensitive capabilitycancel_pipelineno sensitive capabilityclose_epicno sensitive capabilityclose_issueno sensitive capabilityclose_milestoneno sensitive capabilityclose_project_milestoneno sensitive capabilitycommit_filesno sensitive capabilitycreate_branchno sensitive capabilitycreate_epicno sensitive capabilitycreate_iterationno sensitive capabilitycreate_labelno sensitive capabilitycreate_merge_requestno sensitive capabilitycreate_milestoneno sensitive capabilitycreate_mr_approval_ruleno sensitive capabilitycreate_mr_discussionno sensitive capabilitycreate_project_milestoneno sensitive capabilitydelete_epic_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_issue_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilitydelete_mr_approval_ruleno sensitive capabilitydelete_mr_noteno sensitive capabilityget_current_userno sensitive capabilityget_epicno sensitive capabilityget_epic_widgetsno sensitive capabilityget_fileno sensitive capabilityget_issueno sensitive capabilityget_job_logno sensitive capabilityget_merge_requestno sensitive capabilityget_milestoneno sensitive capabilityget_mr_diffno sensitive capabilityget_pipelineno sensitive capabilityget_project_milestoneno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_idno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_type_idno sensitive capabilitygitlab_setupno sensitive capabilitylink_work_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_boardsno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_epic_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_epic_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_epicsno sensitive capabilitylist_group_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_iterationsno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_merge_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_milestonesno sensitive capabilitylist_mr_approval_rulesno sensitive capabilitylist_mr_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_pipelinesno sensitive capabilitylist_project_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_project_milestonesno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_protected_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_workitem_statusesno sensitive capabilitymerge_merge_requestno sensitive capabilityprotect_branchno sensitive capabilityrebase_merge_requestno sensitive capabilityremove_memberno sensitive capabilityreopen_epicno sensitive capabilityreopen_issueno sensitive capabilityresolve_mr_discussionno sensitive capabilityretry_pipelineno sensitive capabilitysearch_blobsno sensitive capabilitysearch_issuesno sensitive capabilitysearch_merge_requestsno sensitive capabilitysearch_usersno sensitive capabilityset_epic_health_statusno sensitive capabilityset_epic_iterationno sensitive capabilityset_epic_milestoneno sensitive capabilityset_issue_health_statusno sensitive capabilityunprotect_branchno sensitive capabilityupdate_epicno sensitive capabilityupdate_epic_noteno sensitive capabilityupdate_fileno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_issue_noteno sensitive capabilityupdate_iterationno sensitive capabilityupdate_labelno sensitive capabilityupdate_member_access_levelno sensitive capabilityupdate_merge_requestno sensitive capabilityupdate_milestoneno sensitive capabilityupdate_mr_approval_ruleno sensitive capabilityupdate_mr_noteno sensitive capabilityupdate_project_milestoneno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (101 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @wanadev/mcp-gitlab --onlineOther implementations of GitLab 25
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