Vpsnet — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "vpsnet-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "vpsnet-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "vpsnet-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 98,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 1.8,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 0.6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:31`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/index.js"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "build/index.js",
"line": 31
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"title": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool \"deploy_ssh_key\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "deploy_ssh_key",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "sensitive-target"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"title": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool \"create_ssh_key\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_ssh_key",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "sensitive-target"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_services",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_service",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_service_graphs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_service_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_service",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stop_service",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restart_service",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_hostname",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_root_password",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_rdns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_rdns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "flush_iptables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_title",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "toggle_ipv6",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "toggle_extra_settings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deploy_ssh_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_os_options",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reinstall_os",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_plan_options",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_plan_resources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calculate_plan_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_period_options",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_auto_renew",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "renew_service",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_order_plans",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_order_options",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "order_service",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_backup_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_backup_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_ssh_keys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_ssh_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_ssh_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_ssh_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_api_keys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_api_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_api_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revoke_api_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_invoices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_invoice",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_payments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_login_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_management_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pricing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_system_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_faq",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "178bacd4397da4170568c169eab6689ebb29793c56fc8f17699bb860321f62fd",
"stats": {
"tools": 49,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}