Vpsnet MCP Server
vpsnet-mcp
npm
v1.0.9
Published by bacarrdy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.8 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.8 | Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata ×2 MTC-INJ-TARGET-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 4 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:31`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
low Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadataMTC-INJ-TARGET-1
Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool "deploy_ssh_key". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool deploy_ssh_key · description
low Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadataMTC-INJ-TARGET-1
Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool "create_ssh_key". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool create_ssh_key · description
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
calculate_plan_changeno sensitive capabilitychange_hostnameno sensitive capabilitychange_planno sensitive capabilitychange_rdnsno sensitive capabilitychange_root_passwordno sensitive capabilitychange_titleno sensitive capabilitycreate_api_keyno sensitive capabilitycreate_backupno sensitive capabilitycreate_ssh_keyno sensitive capabilitydelete_ssh_keyno sensitive capabilitydeploy_ssh_keyno sensitive capabilityflush_iptablesno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_backup_historyno sensitive capabilityget_backup_statusno sensitive capabilityget_faqno sensitive capabilityget_invoiceno sensitive capabilityget_login_historyno sensitive capabilityget_management_historyno sensitive capabilityget_order_optionsno sensitive capabilityget_order_plansno sensitive capabilityget_os_optionsno sensitive capabilityget_period_optionsno sensitive capabilityget_plan_optionsno sensitive capabilityget_plan_resourcesno sensitive capabilityget_pricingno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_rdnsno sensitive capabilityget_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_service_graphsno sensitive capabilityget_service_historyno sensitive capabilityget_ssh_keyno sensitive capabilityget_system_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_api_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_invoicesno sensitive capabilitylist_paymentsno sensitive capabilitylist_servicesno sensitive capabilitylist_ssh_keysno sensitive capabilityorder_serviceno sensitive capabilityreinstall_osno sensitive capabilityrenew_serviceno sensitive capabilityrestart_serviceno sensitive capabilityrevoke_api_keyno sensitive capabilityset_auto_renewno sensitive capabilitystart_serviceno sensitive capabilitystop_serviceno sensitive capabilitytoggle_extra_settingsno sensitive capabilitytoggle_ipv6no sensitive capabilityupdate_api_keyno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.9 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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