Vibe Check — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "vibe-check-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "vibe-check-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "vibe-check-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_secure.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_secure.py:384`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_secure.py"
},
"evidence": "\"private_key\", \"id_rsa\", \"id_dsa\", \"id_ecdsa\", \".key\", \".pem\", \".p12\",",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_secure.py",
"line": 384,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/cli.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "ive\") result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=Path(__file__).parent.paren",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/cli.py",
"line": 81,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_patch.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_patch.py:273`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_patch.py"
},
"evidence": "{ name }}\", {\"name\": \"${os.system('rm -rf /')}\"} ) rendered_lower = rendered.lower() template_se",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_patch.py",
"line": 273,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_ultrafast.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_ultrafast.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_ultrafast.py"
},
"evidence": "\"eval(\", \"exec(\", \"__import__\", \"drop table\", \"delete from\", \"; --\", ]",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_ultrafast.py",
"line": 28,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/analyze_llm_backup.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/analyze_llm_backup.py:483`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/tools/analyze_llm_backup.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"gh\", \"auth\", \"token\"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/tools/analyze_llm_backup.py",
"line": 483,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py"
},
"evidence": "version_result = subprocess.run( [\"claude\", \"--version\"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py",
"line": 107,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/diagnostics_claude_cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/diagnostics_claude_cli.py:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/tools/diagnostics_claude_cli.py"
},
"evidence": "which_result = subprocess.run( [\"which\", \"claude\"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/tools/diagnostics_claude_cli.py",
"line": 41,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/review_pr_monolithic_backup.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/review_pr_monolithic_backup.py:142`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/review_pr_monolithic_backup.py"
},
"evidence": "pr_result = subprocess.run( [ \"gh\", \"pr\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/review_pr_monolithic_backup.py",
"line": 142,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/vibe_check_framework.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/vibe_check_framework.py:208`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/vibe_check_framework.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [\"claude\", \"--version\"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/vibe_check_framework.py",
"line": 208,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/claude_integration.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/claude_integration.py:96`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/claude_integration.py"
},
"evidence": "result = subprocess.run( [\"claude\", \"--version\"], capture",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/claude_integration.py",
"line": 96,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/data_collector.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/data_collector.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/data_collector.py"
},
"evidence": "pr_result = subprocess.run( [ \"gh\", \"pr\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/data_collector.py",
"line": 45,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py:407`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(dep) except ImportError: missing_deps.append(dep)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py",
"line": 407,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "resolve_library_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_library_documentation",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_context7_system_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_hybrid_library_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_issue_nollm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_pr_nollm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "review_pr_comprehensive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_integration_alternatives",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_integration_decision_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "integration_decision_framework",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "integration_research_with_websearch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_integration_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "quick_tech_scan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_integration_effort",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vibe_check_mentor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_doom_loops",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "productivity_intervention",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reset_session_tracking",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_project_libraries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "load_project_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_vibe_check_directory_structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "register_project_for_vibe_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "server_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_telemetry_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_text_nollm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "demo_analyze_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "demo_large_prompt_handling",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_llm_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_claude_cli_with_env",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_text_llm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_pr_llm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_code_llm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_issue_llm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_github_issue_llm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "external_claude_analyze",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "external_pr_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "external_code_analysis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "external_issue_analysis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "external_claude_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_mcp_configuration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_claude_cli_integration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claude_cli_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claude_cli_diagnostics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "afb8a976b5e49e637ae73344c26d2ded654d4e08071308b88dccbb0782fdf01c",
"stats": {
"tools": 45,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 11,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}