Vibe Check (kesslerio) MCP Server
vibe-check-mcp
npm
v0.7.1
Published by kesslerio — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Vibe Check MCP - Anti-pattern detection and mentoring for better engineering decisions
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_secure.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_secure.py:384`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "private_key", "id_rsa", "id_dsa", "id_ecdsa", ".key", ".pem", ".p12",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_secure.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/cli.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ive") result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=Path(__file__).parent.paren
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_patch.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_patch.py:273`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { name }}", {"name": "${os.system('rm -rf /')}"} ) rendered_lower = rendered.lower() template_se
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_patch.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_ultrafast.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_ultrafast.py:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "eval(", "exec(", "__import__", "drop table", "delete from", "; --", ]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/mentor/deprecated/mcp_sampling_ultrafast.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/analyze_llm_backup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/analyze_llm_backup.py:483`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["gh", "auth", "token"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/tools/analyze_llm_backup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: version_result = subprocess.run( ["claude", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/diagnostics_claude_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/diagnostics_claude_cli.py:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: which_result = subprocess.run( ["which", "claude"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/tools/diagnostics_claude_cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/review_pr_monolithic_backup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/review_pr_monolithic_backup.py:142`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pr_result = subprocess.run( [ "gh", "pr",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/review_pr_monolithic_backup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/vibe_check_framework.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/vibe_check_framework.py:208`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["claude", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/tools/legacy/vibe_check_framework.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/claude_integration.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/claude_integration.py:96`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( ["claude", "--version"], capture
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/claude_integration.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/data_collector.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/data_collector.py:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pr_result = subprocess.run( [ "gh", "pr",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/tools/pr_review/data_collector.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py:407`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(dep) except ImportError: missing_deps.append(dep)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/vibe_check/tools/config_validation.py
Tools 45
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_library_documentationingests untrusted inputanalyze_code_llmno sensitive capabilityanalyze_doom_loopsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_github_issue_llmno sensitive capabilityanalyze_integration_decision_textno sensitive capabilityanalyze_integration_effortno sensitive capabilityanalyze_integration_patternsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_issue_llmno sensitive capabilityanalyze_issue_nollmno sensitive capabilityanalyze_llm_statusno sensitive capability
Show 35 more tools ↓
analyze_pr_llmno sensitive capabilityanalyze_pr_nollmno sensitive capabilityanalyze_text_llmno sensitive capabilityanalyze_text_nollmno sensitive capabilitycheck_claude_cli_integrationno sensitive capabilitycheck_integration_alternativesno sensitive capabilityclaude_cli_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilityclaude_cli_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_vibe_check_directory_structureno sensitive capabilitydemo_analyze_textno sensitive capabilitydemo_large_prompt_handlingno sensitive capabilitydetect_project_librariesno sensitive capabilityexternal_claude_analyzeno sensitive capabilityexternal_claude_statusno sensitive capabilityexternal_code_analysisno sensitive capabilityexternal_issue_analysisno sensitive capabilityexternal_pr_reviewno sensitive capabilityget_context7_system_statusno sensitive capabilityget_hybrid_library_contextno sensitive capabilityget_telemetry_summaryno sensitive capabilityintegration_decision_frameworkno sensitive capabilityintegration_research_with_websearchno sensitive capabilitylist_toolsno sensitive capabilityload_project_contextno sensitive capabilityproductivity_interventionno sensitive capabilityquick_tech_scanno sensitive capabilityregister_project_for_vibe_checkno sensitive capabilityreset_session_trackingno sensitive capabilityresolve_library_idno sensitive capabilityreview_pr_comprehensiveno sensitive capabilityserver_statusno sensitive capabilitysession_health_checkno sensitive capabilitytest_claude_cli_with_envno sensitive capabilityvalidate_mcp_configurationno sensitive capabilityvibe_check_mentorno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan vibe-check-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Vibe Check 2
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