Vesper MCP Server

vesper PyPI v0.4.14

Published by haroldmills — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
D
64/100
Last scanned
Trust
D · 64/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
D Why this grade 100 − 36.4 = 64/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−27 Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value ×3 MTC-SRC-010 injection
−9.5 Unsafe deserialization ×2 MTC-SRC-007 permissions

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 9

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (vesper/django/app/static/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`vesper/django/app/static/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js:3722`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server vesper/django/app/static/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.2063d12449ae.js)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.2063d12449ae.js:3722`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.2063d12449ae.js

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js:3722`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js

high Dynamic code execution in server code (vesper/django/app/static/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`vesper/django/app/static/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js:3722`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server vesper/django/app/static/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js

high Dynamic code execution in server code (vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.2063d12449ae.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.2063d12449ae.js:3722`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.2063d12449ae.js

high Dynamic code execution in server code (vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js:3722`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server vesper/django/staticfiles/third-party/jasmine-3.10.1/jasmine.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (vesper/old_bird/old_bird_detector_runner.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`vesper/old_bird/old_bird_detector_runner.py:288`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.Popen(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server vesper/old_bird/old_bird_detector_runner.py

medium Unsafe deserialization (vesper/command/execute_deferred_actions_command.py)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`vesper/command/execute_deferred_actions_command.py:94`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: pickle.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server vesper/command/execute_deferred_actions_command.py

medium Unsafe deserialization (vesper/mpg_ranch/species_classifier.py)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`vesper/mpg_ranch/species_classifier.py:60`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: pickle.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server vesper/mpg_ranch/species_classifier.py

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.4.14 latest D 64/100 9 1.5.0 2026-07-23

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: D · 64/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/vesper/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/vesper)
HTML
<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/vesper"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/vesper/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>
Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/vesper/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan vesper --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

More in Design & Media