Vemdev MCP Server
@vemdev/mcp-server
npm
v0.1.6
Source verified
Published by vem-dev — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Official VEM MCP Server for AI agent project memory.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 10 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nc as execSync4 } from "child_process"; import { createHash as createHash4 } from "crypto"; import { readdir, readFile,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:608`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ePath; const hash = execSync(`git log -1 --format=%H -- "${relative2.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`, { cwd: root,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_context_sectioningests untrusted inputadd_decisionno sensitive capabilityadd_taskno sensitive capabilityapply_vem_updateno sensitive capabilityask_questionno sensitive capabilitycomplete_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilitydeposit_planno sensitive capabilityget_active_tasksno sensitive capabilityget_changelogno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
get_constitutionno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_context_indexno sensitive capabilityget_cycle_contextno sensitive capabilityget_cycle_healthno sensitive capabilityget_cycle_retrospectiveno sensitive capabilityget_flow_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_planno sensitive capabilityget_subtasksno sensitive capabilityget_task_contextno sensitive capabilityget_task_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_task_specno sensitive capabilitylist_agent_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_decisionsno sensitive capabilitylist_plansno sensitive capabilitylist_skillsno sensitive capabilityrun_feedback_sensorsno sensitive capabilitysave_session_statsno sensitive capabilitysearch_memoryno sensitive capabilityset_task_specno sensitive capabilitystart_taskno sensitive capabilitysync_pullno sensitive capabilitysync_pushno sensitive capabilityupdate_current_stateno sensitive capabilityupdate_taskno sensitive capabilityupdate_task_contextno sensitive capabilityvalidate_cycleno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.6 latest |
B 84/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @vemdev/mcp-server --onlineMore in AI, Memory & Reasoning
FDA device & vehicle recall risk for AI agents: recall history, MAUDE trend, risk score.
Open-source MCP server exposing Agent402.Tools' catalog — 500+ strong: 400+ self-hostable tools + 100 multi-tool skill packs (security-audit, trend-analysis, structured-scrape, decode-blob, forecasting-bake-off) for AI agents — browser, web search & answe
Zero-dependency MCP server that gives AI agents a self-updating project memory in AGENTS.md. Returns merge instructions instead of mutating state, so every change is a reviewable diff.
MCP Apps UI resources and server helpers for n8n
MCP server providing comprehensive access to BookStack knowledge management system
MCP server for tracking achievements with STAR methodology