Mikrotik (usex) MCP Server
@usex/mikrotik-mcp
npm
v5.6.0
Published by @usex — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for MikroTik RouterOS — 780+ tools over SSH for firewall, NAT, routing, DHCP, DNS, WireGuard, wireless, QoS and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:247`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { readFileSync as readFileSync3 } from "fs"; import { homedir as homedir3
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:697`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { const res = await fetch(`https://ipkit.ir/${ip}`, { headers: { accept: "application/json" }, signal: Abort
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v5.5.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v5.3.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v5.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v5.1.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v4.24.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v4.23.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @usex/mikrotik-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Mikrotik 2
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