Universal Ast Mapper — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "universal-ast-mapper",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "universal-ast-mapper"
},
"server": {
"name": "universal-ast-mapper"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 81,
"threatScore": 89,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/fix.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/fix.js:57`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/fix.js"
},
"evidence": "issue.message}. Replace eval() with a safer alternative such as JSON.parse() for data, or Function() with strict input v",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/fix.js",
"line": 57,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/security.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security.js:9`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security.js"
},
"evidence": "message: \"Use of eval() allows arbitrary code execution\", // matches eval( but not eval.toString( or eval",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/security.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2029`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "cp = await import(\"node:child_process\"); const cmd = process.platform === \"darwin\" ? \"open\" : process.platform =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 2029,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/gitdiff.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/gitdiff.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/gitdiff.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import os from \"node:os\"; import path from \"node:path\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/gitdiff.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/incremental.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/incremental.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/incremental.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import crypto from \"node",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/incremental.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/security.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security.js:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security.js"
},
"evidence": "message: \"Use of child_process module can lead to command injection if inputs are not sanitized\", pattern",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/security.js",
"line": 36,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2032`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "try { cp.execSync(`${cmd} http://localhost:${port}`); } catch { /* ignore */ } }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 2032,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/incremental.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/incremental.js:74`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/incremental.js"
},
"evidence": "y { const raw = execSync(`git diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACM ${base}`, { cwd: root,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/incremental.js",
"line": 74,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/plugins.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/plugins.js:15`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/plugins.js"
},
"evidence": "const mod = await import(abs); const plugin = \"default\" in mod && isPlugin(mod.default) ? mod.default",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/plugins.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"universal-ast-mapper\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "universal-ast-mapper"
},
"evidence": "node scripts/install-skill.mjs",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"universal-ast-mapper\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "universal-ast-mapper"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_supported_languages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_skeleton_json",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_skeleton",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_symbol_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_architecture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_imports",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build_symbol_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_api_surface",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_dead_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_circular_deps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_duplicate_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_complexity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_unused_params",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trace_type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_source_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_codebase_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_quality_gate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_risk_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pack_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_coupling",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_layer_violations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_module_coupling",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_change_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_call_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "semantic_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_test_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_deps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_top_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_code_smells",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_pr_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_diagram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_fix_suggestions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_tests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_tests_ai",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_refactor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "explain_symbol",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_similar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_plugins",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_arch_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "58edaf8bd5942266899a103f93c48d5a0c112cd4e64be3ef5d78ffc957033f50",
"stats": {
"tools": 46,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}