Universal Ast Mapper MCP Server
universal-ast-mapper
npm
v2.0.8
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server that maps source files into a normalized code skeleton (JSON + HTML) using tree-sitter.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 10.6 = 89. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 89 − 8 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/fix.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/fix.js:57`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: issue.message}. Replace eval() with a safer alternative such as JSON.parse() for data, or Function() with strict input v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/fix.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/security.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/security.js:9`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: message: "Use of eval() allows arbitrary code execution", // matches eval( but not eval.toString( or eval
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/security.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2029`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cp = await import("node:child_process"); const cmd = process.platform === "darwin" ? "open" : process.platform =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/gitdiff.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/gitdiff.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/gitdiff.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/incremental.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/incremental.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; import crypto from "node
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/incremental.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/security.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/security.js:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: message: "Use of child_process module can lead to command injection if inputs are not sanitized", pattern
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/security.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2032`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { cp.execSync(`${cmd} http://localhost:${port}`); } catch { /* ignore */ } }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/incremental.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/incremental.js:74`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y { const raw = execSync(`git diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACM ${base}`, { cwd: root,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/incremental.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/plugins.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/plugins.js:15`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = await import(abs); const plugin = "default" in mod && isPlugin(mod.default) ? mod.default
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/plugins.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"universal-ast-mapper" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/install-skill.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package universal-ast-mapper
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ai_refactorno sensitive capabilityanalyze_pr_diffno sensitive capabilityanalyze_workspaceno sensitive capabilitybuild_indexno sensitive capabilitybuild_symbol_graphno sensitive capabilitycheck_arch_rulesno sensitive capabilitycheck_quality_gateno sensitive capabilitydetect_code_smellsno sensitive capabilityexplain_symbolno sensitive capabilityfind_api_surfaceno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
find_circular_depsno sensitive capabilityfind_dead_codeno sensitive capabilityfind_duplicate_symbolsno sensitive capabilityfind_similarno sensitive capabilityfind_unused_paramsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_diagramno sensitive capabilitygenerate_docsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_skeletonno sensitive capabilitygenerate_testsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_tests_aino sensitive capabilityget_call_graphno sensitive capabilityget_change_impactno sensitive capabilityget_codebase_reportno sensitive capabilityget_complexityno sensitive capabilityget_couplingno sensitive capabilityget_diffno sensitive capabilityget_file_depsno sensitive capabilityget_fix_suggestionsno sensitive capabilityget_layer_violationsno sensitive capabilityget_module_couplingno sensitive capabilityget_risk_mapno sensitive capabilityget_skeleton_jsonno sensitive capabilityget_symbol_contextno sensitive capabilityget_test_coverageno sensitive capabilityget_top_symbolsno sensitive capabilitylist_supported_languagesno sensitive capabilitymerge_coverageno sensitive capabilitypack_contextno sensitive capabilityread_source_mapno sensitive capabilityresolve_importsno sensitive capabilityrun_pluginsno sensitive capabilityscan_securityno sensitive capabilitysearch_symbolno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capabilitytrace_typeno sensitive capabilityvalidate_architectureno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.8 latest |
B 81/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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