Uiautomator2 (tanbro) MCP Server
uiautomator2-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.3.3
Published by tanbro — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
uiautomator2 mcp server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([dump_hierarchy, save_dump_hierarchy]) and tools that can send data out ([shell_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [dump_hierarchy, save_dump_hierarchy] → sinks [shell_command]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow dump_hierarchy → shell_command
high Tool "shell_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_command
low Mutating tool "shell_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_command
Tools 77
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
dump_hierarchyreads sensitive datasave_dump_hierarchyreads sensitive datashell_commandruns code / shellactivity_wait_appearno sensitive capabilityapp_auto_grant_permissionsno sensitive capabilityapp_clearno sensitive capabilityapp_currentno sensitive capabilityapp_infono sensitive capabilityapp_installno sensitive capabilityapp_listno sensitive capability
Show 67 more tools ↓
app_list_runningno sensitive capabilityapp_startno sensitive capabilityapp_stopno sensitive capabilityapp_stop_allno sensitive capabilityapp_uninstallno sensitive capabilityapp_uninstall_allno sensitive capabilityapp_waitno sensitive capabilityclear_textno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilityconnectno sensitive capabilitydelayno sensitive capabilitydevice_listno sensitive capabilitydisconnectno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_allno sensitive capabilitydouble_clickno sensitive capabilitydragno sensitive capabilityget_orientationno sensitive capabilityget_toastno sensitive capabilityhide_keyboardno sensitive capabilityinfono sensitive capabilityinitno sensitive capabilitylong_clickno sensitive capabilityopen_notificationno sensitive capabilityopen_quick_settingsno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilitypurgeno sensitive capabilityread_clipboardno sensitive capabilityreset_toastno sensitive capabilitysave_screenshotno sensitive capabilityscreen_offno sensitive capabilityscreen_onno sensitive capabilityscreen_recordno sensitive capabilityscreen_record_startno sensitive capabilityscreen_record_stopno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilitysend_textno sensitive capabilityset_focused_textno sensitive capabilityset_orientationno sensitive capabilityshow_toastno sensitive capabilitystart_scrcpyno sensitive capabilitystop_scrcpyno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilityswipe_downno sensitive capabilityswipe_extno sensitive capabilityswipe_leftno sensitive capabilityswipe_pointsno sensitive capabilityswipe_rightno sensitive capabilityswipe_upno sensitive capabilityunlockno sensitive capabilitywindow_sizeno sensitive capabilitywrite_clipboardno sensitive capabilityxpath_clickno sensitive capabilityxpath_click_nowaitno sensitive capabilityxpath_existsno sensitive capabilityxpath_get_attribno sensitive capabilityxpath_get_boundsno sensitive capabilityxpath_get_infono sensitive capabilityxpath_get_textno sensitive capabilityxpath_long_pressno sensitive capabilityxpath_save_screenshotno sensitive capabilityxpath_screenshotno sensitive capabilityxpath_scrollno sensitive capabilityxpath_scroll_tono sensitive capabilityxpath_set_textno sensitive capabilityxpath_swipeno sensitive capabilityxpath_wait_appearno sensitive capabilityxpath_wait_goneno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (77 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan uiautomator2-mcp-server --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Uiautomator2 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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