Uiautomator2 (stayer147) MCP Server
uiautomator2-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.1
Published by stayer147 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([dump_hierarchy, get_logs]) and tools that can send data out ([shell]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [dump_hierarchy, get_logs] → sinks [shell]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow dump_hierarchy → shell
high Tool "shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/uiautomator2_mcp/adb_tools.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/uiautomator2_mcp/adb_tools.py:65`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e-data") process = subprocess.Popen( command, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/uiautomator2_mcp/adb_tools.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/uiautomator2_mcp/logcat.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/uiautomator2_mcp/logcat.py:216`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: al, *args] result = subprocess.run( command, capture_output=True, text=True, check=F
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/uiautomator2_mcp/logcat.py
low Mutating tool "shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell
Tools 54
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
dump_hierarchyreads sensitive dataget_logsreads sensitive datashellruns code / shellapp_clearno sensitive capabilityapp_infono sensitive capabilityapp_installno sensitive capabilityapp_list_runningno sensitive capabilityapp_startno sensitive capabilityapp_stopno sensitive capabilityapp_uninstallno sensitive capability
Show 44 more tools ↓
clear_logsno sensitive capabilityconnectno sensitive capabilitycurrent_appno sensitive capabilitydevice_infono sensitive capabilitydisconnectno sensitive capabilitydouble_tapno sensitive capabilitydouble_tap_elementno sensitive capabilitydragno sensitive capabilityelement_existsno sensitive capabilityfind_elementno sensitive capabilityflingno sensitive capabilityget_clipboardno sensitive capabilityget_toastno sensitive capabilityget_ui_treeno sensitive capabilityinput_textno sensitive capabilitylist_avdsno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylong_tapno sensitive capabilitymulti_tapno sensitive capabilityopen_notificationno sensitive capabilityopen_quick_settingsno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilitypull_fileno sensitive capabilitypush_fileno sensitive capabilityscreen_offno sensitive capabilityscreen_onno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityscroll_to_elementno sensitive capabilityset_clipboardno sensitive capabilityset_element_textno sensitive capabilitystart_emulatorno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilitytapno sensitive capabilitytap_and_waitno sensitive capabilitytap_elementno sensitive capabilitytap_sequenceno sensitive capabilityunlockno sensitive capabilitywait_elementno sensitive capabilitywait_element_goneno sensitive capabilitywatcher_addno sensitive capabilitywatcher_removeno sensitive capabilitywatcher_startno sensitive capabilitywatcher_stopno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (54 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan uiautomator2-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Uiautomator2 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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