Vault Storage — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@uhop/vault-storage-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@uhop/vault-storage-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@uhop/vault-storage-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"file-write",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (63 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: vault_handoff_get_artifact → vault_read_file → vault_handoff_get_artifact. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "vault_handoff_get_artifact → vault_read_file → vault_handoff_get_artifact"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"vault_handoff_get_artifact",
"vault_resume_bundle"
],
"sources": [
"vault_read_meta",
"vault_read_file",
"vault_write_file",
"vault_resume_bundle"
],
"sinks": [
"vault_handoff_get_artifact"
],
"path": [
"vault_handoff_get_artifact",
"vault_read_file",
"vault_handoff_get_artifact"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "vault_handoff_get_artifact",
"to": "vault_read_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "vault_read_file",
"to": "vault_handoff_get_artifact",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"vault_write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"vault_write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "vault_write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"vault_delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"vault_delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "vault_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"vault_write_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"vault_write_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "vault_write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"vault_delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"vault_delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "vault_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"vault_read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"vault_read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "vault_read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"vault_write_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"vault_write_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "vault_write_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"vault_delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"vault_delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "vault_delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"vault_handoff_get_artifact",
"vault_resume_bundle"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"vault_read_meta",
"vault_read_file",
"vault_write_file",
"vault_resume_bundle"
],
"externalSink": [
"vault_handoff_get_artifact"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"vault_handoff_get_artifact",
"vault_read_file",
"vault_handoff_get_artifact"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: vault_handoff_get_artifact → vault_read_file → vault_handoff_get_artifact."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "vault_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_context_pack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_list_pieces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_read_piece",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_read_meta",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vault_update_piece",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vault_write_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
],
"file-write": [
"keyword \"write_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vault_append",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_replace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_patch_fm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vault_supersede",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_move",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_propose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_list_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_neighborhood",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_similar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_backlinks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_list_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_tag_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_records_by_tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_list_suggestions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_read_suggestion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_suggestions_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_claim_suggestions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_accept_suggestion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_reject_suggestion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_resolve_suggestions_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_reopen_suggestion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_create_suggestion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_lease_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_lease_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_lease_claim",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_lease_renew",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_lease_release",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_lease_transfer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_claim",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_resolve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_resubmit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_put_artifact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_get_artifact",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
],
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"curl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vault_handoff_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_lint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_resume_bundle",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vault_raw_inbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_cleanup_lint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_embed_pending",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_incremental_reindex",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_run_scans",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_queue_top",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_queue_by_section",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_queue_by_priority",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_queue_by_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_queue_ready",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_queue_blocked",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_queue_project_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_queue_reindex",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "db0ea8d3ace09e9ae626fd31219da2cce8a0f2a70a767f5e1d9a61443ae248f4",
"stats": {
"tools": 63,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 2,
"low": 5,
"info": 0
}
}
}