Vault Storage MCP Server
@uhop/vault-storage-mcp
npm
v0.6.0
Published by @uhop — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP adapter for vault-storage. Exposes the REST API as MCP tools/resources for Claude Code.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: vault_handoff_get_artifact → vault_read_file → vault_handoff_get_artifact. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow vault_handoff_get_artifact → vault_read_file → vault_handoff_get_artifact
medium Tool "vault_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "vault_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool vault_write_file
medium Tool "vault_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "vault_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool vault_delete_file
low Mutating tool "vault_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "vault_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool vault_write_file
low Mutating tool "vault_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "vault_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool vault_delete_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "vault_read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "vault_read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool vault_read_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "vault_write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "vault_write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool vault_write_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "vault_delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "vault_delete_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool vault_delete_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 63
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
vault_handoff_get_artifactingests untrusted inputnetwork egressvault_resume_bundleingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datavault_write_filereads sensitive datawrites filesvault_delete_filewrites filesvault_read_filereads sensitive datavault_read_metareads sensitive datavault_accept_suggestionno sensitive capabilityvault_appendno sensitive capabilityvault_backlinksno sensitive capabilityvault_claim_suggestionsno sensitive capability
Show 53 more tools ↓
vault_cleanup_lintno sensitive capabilityvault_context_packno sensitive capabilityvault_create_suggestionno sensitive capabilityvault_embed_pendingno sensitive capabilityvault_handoff_claimno sensitive capabilityvault_handoff_createno sensitive capabilityvault_handoff_eventsno sensitive capabilityvault_handoff_getno sensitive capabilityvault_handoff_listno sensitive capabilityvault_handoff_noteno sensitive capabilityvault_handoff_put_artifactno sensitive capabilityvault_handoff_resolveno sensitive capabilityvault_handoff_resubmitno sensitive capabilityvault_incremental_reindexno sensitive capabilityvault_lease_claimno sensitive capabilityvault_lease_eventsno sensitive capabilityvault_lease_listno sensitive capabilityvault_lease_releaseno sensitive capabilityvault_lease_renewno sensitive capabilityvault_lease_transferno sensitive capabilityvault_lintno sensitive capabilityvault_list_folderno sensitive capabilityvault_list_piecesno sensitive capabilityvault_list_suggestionsno sensitive capabilityvault_list_tagsno sensitive capabilityvault_moveno sensitive capabilityvault_neighborhoodno sensitive capabilityvault_patch_fmno sensitive capabilityvault_proposeno sensitive capabilityvault_queue_blockedno sensitive capabilityvault_queue_by_priorityno sensitive capabilityvault_queue_by_projectno sensitive capabilityvault_queue_by_sectionno sensitive capabilityvault_queue_project_archiveno sensitive capabilityvault_queue_readyno sensitive capabilityvault_queue_reindexno sensitive capabilityvault_queue_topno sensitive capabilityvault_raw_inboxno sensitive capabilityvault_read_pieceno sensitive capabilityvault_read_suggestionno sensitive capabilityvault_records_by_tagno sensitive capabilityvault_reject_suggestionno sensitive capabilityvault_reopen_suggestionno sensitive capabilityvault_replaceno sensitive capabilityvault_resolve_suggestions_batchno sensitive capabilityvault_run_scansno sensitive capabilityvault_searchno sensitive capabilityvault_similarno sensitive capabilityvault_statusno sensitive capabilityvault_suggestions_summaryno sensitive capabilityvault_supersedeno sensitive capabilityvault_tag_infono sensitive capabilityvault_update_pieceno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (63 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.3.1 |
A 96/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v0.2.0 |
A 96/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v0.0.8 |
A 96/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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