Twining — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "twining-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "twining-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "twining-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/server.bundle.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.bundle.mjs:2964`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.bundle.mjs"
},
"evidence": "const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/server.bundle.mjs",
"line": 2964,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/validate-records.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/validate-records.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/validate-records.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import yaml from \"js-yaml\"; import { resolveProjectRoot } from \"../utils/project",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/validate-records.js",
"line": 21,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/dashboard/repo-info.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard/repo-info.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/dashboard/repo-info.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; /** Normalize a git remote URL to a browsable https URL, or null. */ export func",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/dashboard/repo-info.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/staleness.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/staleness.js:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/engine/staleness.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { listLocalBranches } from \"../utils/git-branches.js\"; const SCOPE_PATH_M",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/engine/staleness.js",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/verify.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/verify.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/engine/verify.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; const ALL_CHECKS = [ \"test_coverage\", \"warnings\", \"assembly\", \"d",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/engine/verify.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.bundle.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.bundle.mjs:14421`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.bundle.mjs"
},
"evidence": "cFileSync9 } from \"node:child_process\"; function* jsonFiles2(dir, onDirError) { if (!fs32.existsSync(dir)) return; l",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/server.bundle.mjs",
"line": 14421,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/storage/sync/sync-manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/storage/sync/sync-manager.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/storage/sync/sync-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { ingestRecords } from \"./record-ingest.js\"; import { reconcileEmbeddings",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/storage/sync/sync-manager.js",
"line": 26,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/decision-tools.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/decision-tools.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/decision-tools.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { z } from \"zod\"; import { toolResult, tool",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/decision-tools.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/record-tools.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/record-tools.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/record-tools.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { z } from \"zod\"; import { parseDecision } from \"../engine/record-parser.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/record-tools.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/git-branches.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git-branches.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/git-branches.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; /** * Returns the local branch set, or `null` when enumeration fails (git absen",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/git-branches.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/provenance.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/provenance.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/provenance.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; export function captureProvenance(projectRoot) { const recorded_at = new Dat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/provenance.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "twining_post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_recent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_resolve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_dismiss",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_assemble",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_summarize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_what_changed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_discover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_delegate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_acknowledge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_decide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_why",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_trace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_reconsider",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_override",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_promote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_commits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_search_decisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_amend",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_link_commit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_add_entity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_add_relation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_neighbors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_graph_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_prune_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_housekeeping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_archive_stale",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_unarchive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_triage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "twining_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "909a6a8035ef14d44b9cf15ab506c7b2bdde5d57cffbeb8b9bfad790f0263c54",
"stats": {
"tools": 39,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 11,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}