Twining MCP Server
twining-mcp
npm
v2.16.1
Source verified
Published by daveangulo — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Agent coordination MCP server and Claude Code plugin — shared blackboard, decision tracking, and context assembly
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/server.bundle.mjs)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.bundle.mjs:2964`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.bundle.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/validate-records.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/validate-records.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import yaml from "js-yaml"; import { resolveProjectRoot } from "../utils/project
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/validate-records.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/dashboard/repo-info.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/dashboard/repo-info.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; /** Normalize a git remote URL to a browsable https URL, or null. */ export func
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/dashboard/repo-info.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/staleness.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/staleness.js:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { listLocalBranches } from "../utils/git-branches.js"; const SCOPE_PATH_M
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/staleness.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engine/verify.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engine/verify.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; const ALL_CHECKS = [ "test_coverage", "warnings", "assembly", "d
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engine/verify.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server.bundle.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.bundle.mjs:14421`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cFileSync9 } from "node:child_process"; function* jsonFiles2(dir, onDirError) { if (!fs32.existsSync(dir)) return; l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.bundle.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/storage/sync/sync-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/storage/sync/sync-manager.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { ingestRecords } from "./record-ingest.js"; import { reconcileEmbeddings
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/storage/sync/sync-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/decision-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/decision-tools.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import { z } from "zod"; import { toolResult, tool
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/decision-tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/record-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/record-tools.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { z } from "zod"; import { parseDecision } from "../engine/record-parser.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/record-tools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/git-branches.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git-branches.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; /** * Returns the local branch set, or `null` when enumeration fails (git absen
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/git-branches.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/provenance.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/provenance.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; export function captureProvenance(projectRoot) { const recorded_at = new Dat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/provenance.js
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
twining_acknowledgeno sensitive capabilitytwining_add_entityno sensitive capabilitytwining_add_relationno sensitive capabilitytwining_agentsno sensitive capabilitytwining_amendno sensitive capabilitytwining_archiveno sensitive capabilitytwining_archive_staleno sensitive capabilitytwining_assembleno sensitive capabilitytwining_commitsno sensitive capabilitytwining_decideno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
twining_delegateno sensitive capabilitytwining_discoverno sensitive capabilitytwining_dismissno sensitive capabilitytwining_exportno sensitive capabilitytwining_graph_queryno sensitive capabilitytwining_handoffno sensitive capabilitytwining_housekeepingno sensitive capabilitytwining_link_commitno sensitive capabilitytwining_neighborsno sensitive capabilitytwining_overrideno sensitive capabilitytwining_postno sensitive capabilitytwining_promoteno sensitive capabilitytwining_prune_graphno sensitive capabilitytwining_queryno sensitive capabilitytwining_readno sensitive capabilitytwining_recentno sensitive capabilitytwining_reconsiderno sensitive capabilitytwining_recordno sensitive capabilitytwining_registerno sensitive capabilitytwining_resolveno sensitive capabilitytwining_search_decisionsno sensitive capabilitytwining_statusno sensitive capabilitytwining_summarizeno sensitive capabilitytwining_traceno sensitive capabilitytwining_triageno sensitive capabilitytwining_unarchiveno sensitive capabilitytwining_verifyno sensitive capabilitytwining_what_changedno sensitive capabilitytwining_whyno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.16.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v2.16.0 |
A 94/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v2.15.0 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v2.13.0 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v2.12.0 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.11.0 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.8.0 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v2.6.0 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v2.5.0 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v2.4.0 |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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