Dock — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "https://trydock.ai/api/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "http",
"origin": "https://trydock.ai/api/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "dock",
"version": "1.0.0"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "live",
"label": "inspection depth (live) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "live",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": false,
"packageMetadata": false,
"liveTransport": true
},
"caveats": []
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: create_surface → list_files → address_book. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "create_surface → list_files → address_book"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_workspace",
"get_row",
"create_surface",
"update_surface",
"get_comment_thread",
"get_file",
"share_file"
],
"sources": [
"create_surface",
"list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"update_doc",
"create_webhook",
"update_webhook",
"rotate_webhook_secret",
"delete_webhook",
"send_message",
"address_book"
],
"path": [
"create_surface",
"list_files",
"address_book"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "create_surface",
"to": "list_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "list_files",
"to": "address_book",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"create_webhook\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_webhook\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_webhook",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_id\" on \"delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_id\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_id"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_id"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-NET-005",
"title": "Remote HTTP MCP endpoint",
"category": "network",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Remote endpoint trydock.ai. MCP Trust Checker does not test server-side authentication/authorization; verify the endpoint requires auth.",
"location": {
"kind": "transport"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_workspace",
"get_row",
"create_surface",
"update_surface",
"get_comment_thread",
"get_file",
"share_file"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"create_surface",
"list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"update_doc",
"create_webhook",
"update_webhook",
"rotate_webhook_secret",
"delete_webhook",
"send_message",
"address_book"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"create_surface",
"list_files",
"address_book"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: create_surface → list_files → address_book."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_workspaces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_workspace",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_rows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_row",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_row",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_row",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_row",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_rows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_workspace_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_column",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_workspace_members",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "share_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_workspace_member",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_workspace_member",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_doc",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "validate_doc_markdown",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_doc_section",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "append_doc_section",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_html",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recent_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_billing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upgrade_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "downgrade_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_limit_increase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_surfaces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_surface",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_surface",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_surface",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_api_keys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rotate_api_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revoke_api_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_revoke_agent_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_rotate_agent_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_webhooks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "update_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\"",
"parameter \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "rotate_webhook_secret",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\"",
"parameter \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\"",
"parameter \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_support_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_my_support_tickets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_sheet_functions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_formula",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evaluate_formula",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_comments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_comment_thread",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "reply_to_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unresolve_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "react_to_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "share_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "revoke_file_share",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_recent_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "address_book",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_create_rows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_update_rows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_capabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pull_capability",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "request_connection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "dbcc5f5ad8e39509356100ee2056d32ae534abb13d44110585b7e732d6a44603",
"stats": {
"tools": 70,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 2,
"low": 2,
"info": 1
}
}
}