Dock MCP Server
https://trydock.ai/api/mcp
Remote
v1.0.0
Published by trydock.ai — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The AI workspace for you, your team, and every agent you run. Tables and docs, one live surface.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: create_surface → list_files → address_book. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow create_surface → list_files → address_book
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_id" on "delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "delete_file" takes a path parameter "file_id" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool delete_file · inputSchema.properties.file_id
Tools 70
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
create_surfaceingests untrusted inputreads sensitive dataaddress_booknetwork egresscreate_webhooknetwork egressdelete_filewrites filesdelete_webhooknetwork egressget_comment_threadingests untrusted inputget_fileingests untrusted inputget_rowingests untrusted inputget_workspaceingests untrusted inputlist_filesreads sensitive data
Show 60 more tools ↓
rotate_webhook_secretnetwork egresssend_messagenetwork egressshare_fileingests untrusted inputupdate_docnetwork egressupdate_surfaceingests untrusted inputupdate_webhooknetwork egressadd_columnno sensitive capabilityadd_commentno sensitive capabilityappend_doc_sectionno sensitive capabilitybulk_create_rowsno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_rowsno sensitive capabilitycreate_rowno sensitive capabilitycreate_support_ticketno sensitive capabilitycreate_workspaceno sensitive capabilitydelete_rowno sensitive capabilitydelete_surfaceno sensitive capabilitydelete_workspaceno sensitive capabilitydowngrade_planno sensitive capabilityevaluate_formulano sensitive capabilityget_billingno sensitive capabilityget_docno sensitive capabilityget_htmlno sensitive capabilityget_recent_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_schemano sensitive capabilitylist_api_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_support_ticketsno sensitive capabilitylist_recent_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_rowsno sensitive capabilitylist_sheet_functionsno sensitive capabilitylist_surfacesno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitylist_workspace_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_workspacesno sensitive capabilitymove_rowsno sensitive capabilitypull_capabilityno sensitive capabilityreact_to_commentno sensitive capabilityremove_workspace_memberno sensitive capabilityreply_to_commentno sensitive capabilityrequest_connectionno sensitive capabilityrequest_limit_increaseno sensitive capabilityrequest_revoke_agent_keyno sensitive capabilityrequest_rotate_agent_keyno sensitive capabilityresolve_commentno sensitive capabilityrevoke_api_keyno sensitive capabilityrevoke_file_shareno sensitive capabilityrotate_api_keyno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilityshare_workspaceno sensitive capabilityunresolve_commentno sensitive capabilityupdate_doc_sectionno sensitive capabilityupdate_htmlno sensitive capabilityupdate_rowno sensitive capabilityupdate_workspaceno sensitive capabilityupdate_workspace_memberno sensitive capabilityupgrade_planno sensitive capabilityvalidate_doc_markdownno sensitive capabilityvalidate_formulano sensitive capabilityvalidate_htmlno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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