Raw scan report

Terramcp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "terramcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "terramcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "terramcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 92,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "none",
        "label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
        "appliedPenalty": 2
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can send data / act on an external service",
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "sensitive-source",
      "external-sink"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
      "title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([get_developer_destination_credentials, get_custom_credentials]) and tools that can send data out ([resend_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
      "remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "flow",
        "name": "get_developer_destination_credentials → resend_webhook"
      },
      "evidence": "sources [get_developer_destination_credentials, get_custom_credentials] → sinks [resend_webhook]",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "references": [],
      "data": {
        "sources": [
          "get_developer_destination_credentials",
          "get_custom_credentials"
        ],
        "sinks": [
          "resend_webhook"
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
      "title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/terramcp/server.py)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`src/terramcp/server.py:498`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "src/terramcp/server.py"
      },
      "evidence": "query} response = requests.post( \"https://ubd7f3f36wgejf3kvci5647fby0ueuvi.lambda-url.eu-west-1.on.aws\",",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
        "file": "src/terramcp/server.py",
        "line": 498,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
      "title": "Package declares no source repository",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "info",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"terramcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
      "remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "terramcp"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [
    {
      "id": "flow-1",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "untrustedInput": [],
      "sensitiveSource": [
        "get_developer_destination_credentials",
        "get_custom_credentials"
      ],
      "externalSink": [
        "resend_webhook"
      ],
      "selfContained": false,
      "path": [
        "get_custom_credentials",
        "resend_webhook"
      ],
      "pathWired": false,
      "description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: get_custom_credentials → resend_webhook."
    }
  ],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "terra_get_integrations",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "terra_get_detailed_integrations",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_destinations",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_developer_destination_credentials",
      "tags": [
        "sensitive-source"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "sensitive-source": [
          "keyword \"get_credentials\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "delete_destination",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "set_destination_state",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "add_developer_destination",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "ping_developer_destination",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "set_provider_keys",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_provider_keys",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_developer_providers",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "add_providers",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "deactivate_provider",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "set_provider_state",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_providers_by_popularity",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "add_custom_credentials",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_custom_credentials",
      "tags": [
        "sensitive-source"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "sensitive-source": [
          "keyword \"get_credentials\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "search_documentation",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "generate_dummy_data",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "get_paginated_webhook_history",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "resend_webhook",
      "tags": [
        "external-sink"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "external-sink": [
          "keyword \"webhook\""
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "487cadbba3feb157af91c220c3f5b69cc11268d26c219aa983868eb3c474b4a2",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 21,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 1,
      "medium": 1,
      "low": 0,
      "info": 1
    }
  }
}