Terramcp MCP Server

terramcp PyPI v0.1.5

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Terra Dashboard MCP - A MCP server for managing your Terra Dashboard.

Trust grade
A
92/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 92/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 2

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([get_developer_destination_credentials, get_custom_credentials]) and tools that can send data out ([resend_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [get_developer_destination_credentials, get_custom_credentials] → sinks [resend_webhook]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow get_developer_destination_credentials → resend_webhook

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/terramcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`src/terramcp/server.py:498`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: query} response = requests.post( "https://ubd7f3f36wgejf3kvci5647fby0ueuvi.lambda-url.eu-west-1.on.aws",

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/terramcp/server.py

Tools 21

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • get_custom_credentialsreads sensitive data
  • get_developer_destination_credentialsreads sensitive data
  • resend_webhooknetwork egress
  • add_custom_credentialsno sensitive capability
  • add_developer_destinationno sensitive capability
  • add_providersno sensitive capability
  • deactivate_providerno sensitive capability
  • delete_destinationno sensitive capability
  • generate_dummy_datano sensitive capability
  • get_destinationsno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
  • get_developer_providersno sensitive capability
  • get_paginated_webhook_historyno sensitive capability
  • get_provider_keysno sensitive capability
  • get_providers_by_popularityno sensitive capability
  • ping_developer_destinationno sensitive capability
  • search_documentationno sensitive capability
  • set_destination_stateno sensitive capability
  • set_provider_keysno sensitive capability
  • set_provider_stateno sensitive capability
  • terra_get_detailed_integrationsno sensitive capability
  • terra_get_integrationsno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.5 latest A 92/100 2 1.13.0 2026-08-25

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 92/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan terramcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

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