Products — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@telora/mcp-products",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@telora/mcp-products"
},
"server": {
"name": "@telora/mcp-products"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (62 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/handlers/daemonConfig.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/handlers/daemonConfig.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/handlers/daemonConfig.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { homedir } from \"node:os\"; // Identity keys are always overwritten by a",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/handlers/daemonConfig.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/reality-tree/de-restatement.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/reality-tree/de-restatement.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/reality-tree/de-restatement.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 2 * 60 * 1000; export const RESTATEMENT_SYSTEM_PROMPT",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/reality-tree/de-restatement.js",
"line": 22,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/postinstall.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const { readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync } = require(\"fs\"); c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/postinstall.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"@telora/mcp-products\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@telora/mcp-products"
},
"evidence": "node scripts/postinstall.js || true",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "telora_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_code_observation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_connector_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_connector_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_context_assemble",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_contract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_contract_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_product_delivery",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_deployment_profile",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_env\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "telora_discover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_endpoint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_external_data_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_external_reference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_product_focus_debug",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_product_focus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_product_strategy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_infra_environment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_infra_asset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_infra_relationship",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_infra_secret",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_product_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_linear",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_local_model",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_loop_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_loop_question",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_loop_answer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_loop_persona",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_loop_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_playbook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_prd",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_prd_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_product",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_product_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_tree",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_tree_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_tree_edge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_tree_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_tree_traverse",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_tree_injection_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_tree_injection_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_drift",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_tree_progenitor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_reality_tree_injection_verify",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_product_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_report_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_risk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_risk_dependency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_risk_communication",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_service_definition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_session_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_starter_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_wiki_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_wiki_page_get",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "telora_wiki_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_wiki_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_wiki_page_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_wiki_page_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_wiki_page_split",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_wiki_page_merge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_wiki_page_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "telora_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a51b3b5c6c82b8bc4b3a0cdec1cb453c0606a06c114cea3b8a9cfe0e078d9207",
"stats": {
"tools": 62,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}