Products MCP Server
@telora/mcp-products
npm
v0.22.135
Published by @telora — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server exposing Telora product operations to Claude Code
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/handlers/daemonConfig.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/handlers/daemonConfig.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; // Identity keys are always overwritten by a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/handlers/daemonConfig.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/reality-tree/de-restatement.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/reality-tree/de-restatement.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 2 * 60 * 1000; export const RESTATEMENT_SYSTEM_PROMPT
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/reality-tree/de-restatement.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require("child_process"); const { readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync } = require("fs"); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@telora/mcp-products" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @telora/mcp-products
Tools 62
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
telora_deployment_profilereads sensitive datatelora_reality_treereads sensitive datatelora_wiki_page_getingests untrusted inputtelora_agentno sensitive capabilitytelora_code_observationno sensitive capabilitytelora_connector_startno sensitive capabilitytelora_connector_stopno sensitive capabilitytelora_context_assembleno sensitive capabilitytelora_contractno sensitive capabilitytelora_contract_versionno sensitive capability
Show 52 more tools ↓
telora_discoverno sensitive capabilitytelora_endpointno sensitive capabilitytelora_external_data_sourceno sensitive capabilitytelora_external_referenceno sensitive capabilitytelora_infra_assetno sensitive capabilitytelora_infra_environmentno sensitive capabilitytelora_infra_relationshipno sensitive capabilitytelora_infra_secretno sensitive capabilitytelora_linearno sensitive capabilitytelora_local_modelno sensitive capabilitytelora_loop_agentno sensitive capabilitytelora_loop_answerno sensitive capabilitytelora_loop_documentno sensitive capabilitytelora_loop_personano sensitive capabilitytelora_loop_questionno sensitive capabilitytelora_playbookno sensitive capabilitytelora_prdno sensitive capabilitytelora_prd_treeno sensitive capabilitytelora_productno sensitive capabilitytelora_product_deliveryno sensitive capabilitytelora_product_focusno sensitive capabilitytelora_product_focus_debugno sensitive capabilitytelora_product_issueno sensitive capabilitytelora_product_reportno sensitive capabilitytelora_product_requestno sensitive capabilitytelora_product_strategyno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_driftno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_metricsno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_tree_edgeno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_tree_injection_contextno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_tree_injection_historyno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_tree_injection_verifyno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_tree_linkno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_tree_nodeno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_tree_progenitorno sensitive capabilitytelora_reality_tree_traverseno sensitive capabilitytelora_report_templateno sensitive capabilitytelora_riskno sensitive capabilitytelora_risk_communicationno sensitive capabilitytelora_risk_dependencyno sensitive capabilitytelora_service_definitionno sensitive capabilitytelora_session_stateno sensitive capabilitytelora_starter_repono sensitive capabilitytelora_wiki_auditno sensitive capabilitytelora_wiki_page_archiveno sensitive capabilitytelora_wiki_page_createno sensitive capabilitytelora_wiki_page_mergeno sensitive capabilitytelora_wiki_page_splitno sensitive capabilitytelora_wiki_page_updateno sensitive capabilitytelora_wiki_searchno sensitive capabilitytelora_wiki_treeno sensitive capabilitytelora_workflowno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (62 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.22.135 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.22.133 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.22.130 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.22.126 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.22.123 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.22.122 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.22.121 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.22.116 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v0.22.115 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.22.114 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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