Servicenow (tedorigawa001) MCP Server
@tedorigawa001/servicenow-mcp
npm
v1.11.1
Published by @tedorigawa001 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The most comprehensive ServiceNow MCP server — 450+ tools across all modules. Integrates with Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini, Cursor, GitHub Copilot and any LLM.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/deployment.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/deployment.js:91`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: issues.push('SECURITY: eval() usage detected'); if (script.includes('GlideRecord') && !script.includes('add
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/deployment.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/detect-clients.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/detect-clients.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; function which(bin) { try { // Use 'where' on Windows, 'which' on Un
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/detect-clients.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/writers/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/writers/index.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; /** Build the env block that goes into any JSON-based MCP config. */ function bu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/writers/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/index.js:451`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = await exec(client, name, args); if (result === null) { // The owning module returned null
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/index.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/setup.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import path from 'path'; import { addInstan
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/setup.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.11.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.11.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.10.2 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.10.1 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v1.10.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v1.9.2 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v1.9.1 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v1.8.2 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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