Servicenow (Happy-Technologies-LLC) MCP Server

servicenow-mcp-server npm v2.1.10

Published by happy-technologies-llc — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Multi-instance ServiceNow MCP server with 40+ tools, natural language search, and local script development

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 17

high Tool "SN-Execute-Background-Script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "SN-Execute-Background-Script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool SN-Execute-Background-Script

high Tool "SN-Create-Fix-Script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "SN-Create-Fix-Script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool SN-Create-Fix-Script

high Tool "SN-Create-Workflow" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "SN-Create-Workflow" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool SN-Create-Workflow

high Tool "SN-Create-Activity" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "SN-Create-Activity" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool SN-Create-Activity

high Tool "SN-Create-Transition" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "SN-Create-Transition" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool SN-Create-Transition

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "SN-Execute-Background-Script"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "SN-Execute-Background-Script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool SN-Execute-Background-Script · inputSchema.properties.script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_name" on "SN-Create-Fix-Script"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "SN-Create-Fix-Script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_name" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool SN-Create-Fix-Script · inputSchema.properties.script_name

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_content" on "SN-Create-Fix-Script"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "SN-Create-Fix-Script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_content" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool SN-Create-Fix-Script · inputSchema.properties.script_content

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "SN-Create-Workflow"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "SN-Create-Workflow" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool SN-Create-Workflow · inputSchema.properties.script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "condition_script" on "SN-Create-Workflow"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "SN-Create-Workflow" takes a command-shaped parameter "condition_script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool SN-Create-Workflow · inputSchema.properties.condition_script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "SN-Create-Activity"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "SN-Create-Activity" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool SN-Create-Activity · inputSchema.properties.script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "condition_script" on "SN-Create-Transition"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "SN-Create-Transition" takes a command-shaped parameter "condition_script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool SN-Create-Transition · inputSchema.properties.condition_script

low Mutating tool "SN-Execute-Background-Script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "SN-Execute-Background-Script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool SN-Execute-Background-Script

low Mutating tool "SN-Create-Fix-Script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "SN-Create-Fix-Script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool SN-Create-Fix-Script

low Mutating tool "SN-Create-Workflow" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "SN-Create-Workflow" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool SN-Create-Workflow

low Mutating tool "SN-Create-Activity" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "SN-Create-Activity" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool SN-Create-Activity

low Mutating tool "SN-Create-Transition" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "SN-Create-Transition" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool SN-Create-Transition

Tools 47

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • SN-Create-Activityruns code / shell
  • SN-Create-Fix-Scriptruns code / shell
  • SN-Create-Transitionruns code / shell
  • SN-Create-Workflowruns code / shell
  • SN-Execute-Background-Scriptruns code / shell
  • All ServiceNow Tablesno sensitive capability
  • ServiceNow Instance Infono sensitive capability
  • SN-Add-Change-Commentno sensitive capability
  • SN-Add-Commentno sensitive capability
  • SN-Add-Problem-Commentno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
  • SN-Add-Work-Notesno sensitive capability
  • SN-Approve-Changeno sensitive capability
  • SN-Assign-Changeno sensitive capability
  • SN-Assign-Incidentno sensitive capability
  • SN-Batch-Createno sensitive capability
  • SN-Batch-Updateno sensitive capability
  • SN-Clone-Update-Setno sensitive capability
  • SN-Close-Incidentno sensitive capability
  • SN-Close-Problemno sensitive capability
  • SN-Create-Incidentno sensitive capability
  • SN-Create-Recordno sensitive capability
  • SN-Discover-Table-Schemano sensitive capability
  • SN-Explain-Fieldno sensitive capability
  • SN-Get-Current-Instanceno sensitive capability
  • SN-Get-Current-Update-Setno sensitive capability
  • SN-Get-Incidentno sensitive capability
  • SN-Get-Recordno sensitive capability
  • SN-Get-Table-Schemano sensitive capability
  • SN-Inspect-Update-Setno sensitive capability
  • SN-List-Available-Tablesno sensitive capability
  • SN-List-ChangeRequestsno sensitive capability
  • SN-List-CmdbCisno sensitive capability
  • SN-List-Incidentsno sensitive capability
  • SN-List-Problemsno sensitive capability
  • SN-List-SysUserGroupsno sensitive capability
  • SN-List-SysUsersno sensitive capability
  • SN-List-Update-Setsno sensitive capability
  • SN-Move-Records-To-Update-Setno sensitive capability
  • SN-Natural-Language-Searchno sensitive capability
  • SN-Publish-Workflowno sensitive capability
  • SN-Query-Tableno sensitive capability
  • SN-Resolve-Incidentno sensitive capability
  • SN-Set-Current-Applicationno sensitive capability
  • SN-Set-Instanceno sensitive capability
  • SN-Set-Update-Setno sensitive capability
  • SN-Update-Recordno sensitive capability
  • SN-Validate-Configurationno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.1.10 latest A 93/100 17 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan servicenow-mcp-server --online

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Other implementations of Servicenow 8

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 9 side by side →

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