Teachable MCP Server
teachable-mcp-server
npm
v0.0.1
Published by ahmedrowaihi — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Server for Teachable API integration - manage courses, users, enrollments and more
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:698`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { throw n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:698`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { throw n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([ListCourses, ShowCourse, ShowCourseEnrollments, ShowLecture, CourseProgress, ListQuizzes, ShowQuiz, ShowQuizResponses, ShowVideo, ListWebhooks, ShowWebhookEvents, ShowPricingPlans, ListPricingPlans, ListTransactions]) co-exist with external-action tools ([ListWebhooks, ShowWebhookEvents]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [ListCourses, ShowCourse, ShowCourseEnrollments, ShowLecture, CourseProgress, ListQuizzes, ShowQuiz, ShowQuizResponses, ShowVideo, ListWebhooks, ShowW
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow ListCourses → ListWebhooks
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ListWebhooksingests untrusted inputnetwork egressShowWebhookEventsingests untrusted inputnetwork egressCourseProgressingests untrusted inputListCoursesingests untrusted inputListPricingPlansingests untrusted inputListQuizzesingests untrusted inputListTransactionsingests untrusted inputShowCourseingests untrusted inputShowCourseEnrollmentsingests untrusted inputShowLectureingests untrusted input
Show 11 more tools ↓
ShowPricingPlansingests untrusted inputShowQuizingests untrusted inputShowQuizResponsesingests untrusted inputShowVideoingests untrusted inputCreateUserno sensitive capabilityEnrollUserno sensitive capabilityListUsersno sensitive capabilityMarkLectureCompleteno sensitive capabilityShowUserno sensitive capabilityUnenrollUserno sensitive capabilityUpdateUserno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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