Android Dev (tanguito) MCP Server
@tanguito/android-dev-mcp
npm
v1.2.0
Published by @tanguito — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Generic Android automation and inspection MCP server powered by ADB.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([android_find_ui, android_session_step, android_ui_dump]) and tools that can send data out ([android_run_shell]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [android_find_ui, android_session_step, android_ui_dump] → sinks [android_run_shell]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow android_find_ui → android_run_shell
high Tool "android_run_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "android_run_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool android_run_shell
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adb.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/adb.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { formatContractError } from "./er
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/adb.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "android_run_shell"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "android_run_shell" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool android_run_shell · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "android_run_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "android_run_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool android_run_shell
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/doctor.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/doctor.js
Tools 41
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
android_find_uireads sensitive dataandroid_run_shellruns code / shellandroid_session_stepreads sensitive dataandroid_ui_dumpreads sensitive dataadb_devicesno sensitive capabilityandroid_app_infono sensitive capabilityandroid_capture_stateno sensitive capabilityandroid_clear_app_datano sensitive capabilityandroid_clear_logcatno sensitive capabilityandroid_current_appno sensitive capability
Show 31 more tools ↓
android_device_infono sensitive capabilityandroid_force_stop_appno sensitive capabilityandroid_generate_reportno sensitive capabilityandroid_get_session_reportno sensitive capabilityandroid_input_textno sensitive capabilityandroid_install_apkno sensitive capabilityandroid_launch_appno sensitive capabilityandroid_list_appsno sensitive capabilityandroid_list_packagesno sensitive capabilityandroid_list_sessionsno sensitive capabilityandroid_list_workflowsno sensitive capabilityandroid_manage_permissionsno sensitive capabilityandroid_open_app_settingsno sensitive capabilityandroid_read_logcatno sensitive capabilityandroid_record_videono sensitive capabilityandroid_run_workflowno sensitive capabilityandroid_screenshotno sensitive capabilityandroid_send_debug_intentno sensitive capabilityandroid_send_intentno sensitive capabilityandroid_set_bluetoothno sensitive capabilityandroid_set_volumeno sensitive capabilityandroid_start_activityno sensitive capabilityandroid_start_sessionno sensitive capabilityandroid_stop_sessionno sensitive capabilityandroid_swipeno sensitive capabilityandroid_tapno sensitive capabilityandroid_tap_resourceno sensitive capabilityandroid_tap_textno sensitive capabilityandroid_tap_uino sensitive capabilityandroid_uninstall_appno sensitive capabilityandroid_wait_for_uino sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @tanguito/android-dev-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Android Dev 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
Unified MCP server for Android development — combines project knowledge, Android CLI execution, live dependency versions, and agentic workflow tools for Claude Code.
Security scan results for the Android Dev (npm) MCP server.
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