Android Dev (maheshmishra271090-design) MCP Server
@maheshmishra271090-design/android-dev-mcp
npm
v1.1.1
Published by @maheshmishra271090-design — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Unified MCP server for Android development — combines project knowledge, Android CLI execution, live dependency versions, and agentic workflow tools for Claude Code.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 18
high Tool "run_android_cli" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_android_cli" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_android_cli
high Tool "run_adb" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_adb" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_adb
high Tool "run_git" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_git" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_git
high Tool "run_gradle" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_gradle" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_gradle
high Tool "run_bash" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_bash" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "bash" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_bash
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require("child_process"); const fs = require("fs"); const path = require("path"); const os = require("os"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const KNOWLEDGE_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "../knowl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_android_cli"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_android_cli" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_android_cli · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_adb"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_adb" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_adb · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_git"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_git" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_git · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_gradle"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_gradle" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_gradle · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_bash"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_bash" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_bash · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:87`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ommand === "start") { require(SERVER_ENTRY); } else if (command === "setup-claude-md") { // Optional --dir flag: an
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
low Mutating tool "run_android_cli" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_android_cli" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_android_cli
low Mutating tool "run_adb" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_adb" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_adb
low Mutating tool "run_git" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_git" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_git
low Mutating tool "run_gradle" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_gradle" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_gradle
low Mutating tool "run_bash" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_bash" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_bash
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
run_adbruns code / shellrun_android_cliruns code / shellrun_bashruns code / shellrun_gitruns code / shellrun_gradleruns code / shellcheck_ui_fluidityno sensitive capabilityfluidity_debug_workflowno sensitive capabilitygenerate_testsno sensitive capabilityget_android_cli_guideno sensitive capabilityget_api_backend_patternsno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
get_architecture_patternsno sensitive capabilityget_cicd_commandsno sensitive capabilityget_full_contextno sensitive capabilityget_git_workflowno sensitive capabilityget_live_versionsno sensitive capabilityget_model_routingno sensitive capabilityget_player_patternsno sensitive capabilityget_project_structureno sensitive capabilityget_prompt_templatesno sensitive capabilityget_session_hygieneno sensitive capabilityget_tooling_setupno sensitive capabilityget_ui_compose_standardsno sensitive capabilityscaffold_featureno sensitive capabilityverify_uino sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 18 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @maheshmishra271090-design/android-dev-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Android Dev 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
Generic Android automation and inspection MCP server powered by ADB.
Security scan results for the Android Dev (npm) MCP server.
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