Talkito MCP Server
talkito
PyPI
v1.0.0
Published by robdmac — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Universal TTS wrapper and voice interaction library for command-line programs
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (talkito/asr.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`talkito/asr.py:1977`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: credentials (env vars, ~/.aws/credentials, or IAM role)" try: import boto3 # Try to create a session
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server talkito/asr.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (talkito/tts.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`talkito/tts.py:1087`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: credentials (env vars, ~/.aws/credentials, or IAM role)" try: import boto3 # Try to create a session
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server talkito/tts.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (setup.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`setup.py:32`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ="utf-8") as f: exec(compile(f.read(), version_file, "exec"), version_locals) return version_locals["__versi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`setup.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ="utf-8") as f: exec(compile(f.read(), version_file, "exec"), version_locals) return version_locals["__versi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (talkito/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`talkito/cli.py:488`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run(['pbcopy'], input=SLACK_BOT_MANIFEST.encode(), check=True) print("✅ M
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server talkito/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (talkito/clients.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`talkito/clients.py:190`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(['which', 'talkito'], capture_output=True, text=True) if result.returncod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server talkito/clients.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (talkito/comms.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`talkito/comms.py:1095`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self.tunnel_process = subprocess.Popen( zrok_cmd, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, # Prevent
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server talkito/comms.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (talkito/models.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`talkito/models.py:101`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ") result = subprocess.run([ sys.executable, '-m', 'spacy', 'download', spacy_model
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server talkito/models.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (talkito/tts.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`talkito/tts.py:818`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self.process = subprocess.Popen( chosen_cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server talkito/tts.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (talkito/update.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`talkito/update.py:139`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cal changes subprocess.run(['git', 'stash'], capture_output=True) # Pull latest cha
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server talkito/update.py
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
start_slack_modenetwork egressstart_whatsapp_modenetwork egresschange_asrno sensitive capabilitychange_ttsno sensitive capabilityconfigure_asrno sensitive capabilityconfigure_communicationno sensitive capabilityconfigure_ttsno sensitive capabilitycycle_tts_voiceno sensitive capabilitydisable_asrno sensitive capabilitydisable_ttsno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
enable_asrno sensitive capabilityenable_ttsno sensitive capabilityget_communication_statusno sensitive capabilityget_dictated_textno sensitive capabilityget_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_slack_mode_statusno sensitive capabilityget_speech_statusno sensitive capabilityget_talkito_statusno sensitive capabilityget_whatsapp_mode_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_tts_voicesno sensitive capabilityrandomize_tts_voiceno sensitive capabilitysend_slackno sensitive capabilitysend_whatsappno sensitive capabilityset_asr_modeno sensitive capabilityset_tts_modeno sensitive capabilityskip_current_speechno sensitive capabilityspeak_textno sensitive capabilitystart_notification_streamno sensitive capabilitystop_all_speechno sensitive capabilitystop_slack_modeno sensitive capabilitystop_voice_inputno sensitive capabilitystop_whatsapp_modeno sensitive capabilityturn_offno sensitive capabilityturn_onno sensitive capabilitywait_for_speech_completionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan talkito --online --registry pypiMore in API Development
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