T2000 Cli MCP Server
@t2000/cli
npm
v11.2.1
Source verified
Published by mission69b — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Agent Wallet for AI agents on Sui — gasless USDC + USDsui sends, Cetus swap, MPP paid API access, MCP integration, scriptable from any shell.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/chunk-3S4QNCPF.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-3S4QNCPF.js:11384`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { return $Function('"use strict"; return (' + expressionSyntax + ").constructor;")(); } catch (e) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-3S4QNCPF.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1210`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess = __require("child_process"); var path2 = __require("path"); var fs = __require("fs"); var proces
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v11.2.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v11.1.6 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v11.1.3 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v11.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v10.39.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v10.38.2 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-25 |
v10.37.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v10.37.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-23 |
v10.36.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v10.35.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @t2000/cli --onlineOther implementations of T2000 Cli 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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