Synology Office — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "synology-office-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "synology-office-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "synology-office-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: drive_download_file → drive_list_files → drive_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "drive_download_file → drive_list_files → drive_upload_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"drive_download_file",
"mailplus_get_message"
],
"sources": [
"drive_list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"drive_upload_file",
"mailplus_send_message"
],
"path": [
"drive_download_file",
"drive_list_files",
"drive_upload_file"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "drive_download_file",
"to": "drive_list_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "drive_list_files",
"to": "drive_upload_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"drive_move_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"drive_move_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"move_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "drive_move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"drive_delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"drive_delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "drive_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"drive_move_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"drive_move_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "drive_move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"drive_delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"drive_delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "drive_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"drive_download_file",
"mailplus_get_message"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"drive_list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"drive_upload_file",
"mailplus_send_message"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"drive_download_file",
"drive_list_files",
"drive_upload_file"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: drive_download_file → drive_list_files → drive_upload_file."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "drive_list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "drive_get_file_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_search_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "drive_download_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "drive_create_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_move_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"move_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "drive_delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "drive_list_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_add_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drive_get_sharing_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_get_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_read_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_write_cells",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_append_rows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_add_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_get_styles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_rename_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_delete_sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_batch_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spreadsheet_register",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mailplus_list_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mailplus_list_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mailplus_get_message",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "mailplus_send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "mailplus_mark_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mailplus_move_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_list_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_list_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_get_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_create_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_update_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_delete_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_create_calendar",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "All calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "summarize-spreadsheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sheet_name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "focus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "draft-email-from-spreadsheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "row_number",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recipient_column",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schedule-from-list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "title_column",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "date_column",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "description_column",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "e4269c559d400dbb733edb1d7e718d7b20f12b7988e8687d5bbdcf8be7e0f429",
"stats": {
"tools": 51,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 2,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}