Synology Office MCP Server
synology-office-mcp
npm
v0.4.6
Published by vocweb — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server exposing Synology Drive, Spreadsheet, MailPlus, and Calendar as AI-agent tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: drive_download_file → drive_list_files → drive_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow drive_download_file → drive_list_files → drive_upload_file
medium Tool "drive_move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "drive_move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool drive_move_file
medium Tool "drive_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "drive_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool drive_delete_file
low Mutating tool "drive_move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "drive_move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool drive_move_file
low Mutating tool "drive_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "drive_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool drive_delete_file
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
drive_delete_filewrites filesdrive_download_fileingests untrusted inputdrive_list_filesreads sensitive datadrive_move_filewrites filesdrive_upload_filenetwork egressmailplus_get_messageingests untrusted inputmailplus_send_messagenetwork egressAll calendarsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_create_calendarno sensitive capabilitycalendar_create_eventno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
calendar_delete_eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar_get_eventno sensitive capabilitycalendar_idno sensitive capabilitycalendar_list_calendarsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_list_eventsno sensitive capabilitycalendar_update_eventno sensitive capabilitydate_columnno sensitive capabilitydescription_columnno sensitive capabilitydraft-email-from-spreadsheetno sensitive capabilitydrive_add_labelno sensitive capabilitydrive_create_folderno sensitive capabilitydrive_get_file_infono sensitive capabilitydrive_get_sharing_linkno sensitive capabilitydrive_list_labelsno sensitive capabilitydrive_search_filesno sensitive capabilityfile_idno sensitive capabilityfocusno sensitive capabilitymailplus_list_foldersno sensitive capabilitymailplus_list_messagesno sensitive capabilitymailplus_mark_messagesno sensitive capabilitymailplus_move_messagesno sensitive capabilityrecipient_columnno sensitive capabilityrow_numberno sensitive capabilityschedule-from-listno sensitive capabilitysheet_nameno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_add_sheetno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_append_rowsno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_batch_updateno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_createno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_delete_sheetno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_exportno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_get_infono sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_get_stylesno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_listno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_read_sheetno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_registerno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_rename_sheetno sensitive capabilityspreadsheet_write_cellsno sensitive capabilitysummarize-spreadsheetno sensitive capabilitytemplateno sensitive capabilitytitle_columnno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.6 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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