Docker (swartdraak) MCP Server
@swartdraak/docker-mcp-server
npm
v2.0.0
Published by @swartdraak — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A comprehensive, production-ready MCP Server for Docker management with 37 tools and advanced features
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([container_logs]) and tools that can send data out ([create_container, run_container, exec_container]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [container_logs] → sinks [create_container, run_container, exec_container]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow container_logs → create_container
high Tool "create_container" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "create_container" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool create_container
high Tool "run_container" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_container" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_container
high Tool "exec_container" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_container" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_container
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "create_container"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "create_container" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool create_container · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_container"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_container" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_container · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "exec_container"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "exec_container" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool exec_container · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "create_container" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_container" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_container
low Mutating tool "run_container" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_container" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_container
low Mutating tool "exec_container" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_container" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_container
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
container_logsreads sensitive datacreate_containerruns code / shellexec_containerruns code / shellrun_containerruns code / shellbuild_imageno sensitive capabilityconnect_networkno sensitive capabilitycontainer_statsno sensitive capabilitycreate_networkno sensitive capabilitycreate_volumeno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_networkno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
inspect_containerno sensitive capabilityinspect_networkno sensitive capabilityinspect_volumeno sensitive capabilitylist_containersno sensitive capabilitylist_imagesno sensitive capabilitylist_networksno sensitive capabilitylist_volumesno sensitive capabilitypause_containerno sensitive capabilityprune_containersno sensitive capabilityprune_imagesno sensitive capabilityprune_networksno sensitive capabilityprune_volumesno sensitive capabilitypull_imageno sensitive capabilitypush_imageno sensitive capabilityremove_containerno sensitive capabilityremove_imageno sensitive capabilityremove_networkno sensitive capabilityremove_volumeno sensitive capabilityrename_containerno sensitive capabilityrestart_containerno sensitive capabilitystart_containerno sensitive capabilitystop_containerno sensitive capabilitysystem_infono sensitive capabilitysystem_versionno sensitive capabilitytag_imageno sensitive capabilityunpause_containerno sensitive capabilityvalidate_connectionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @swartdraak/docker-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Docker 14
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 15 side by side →
Community Docker server: manage containers, images, volumes and networks in natural language.
Lets AI agents interact with Docker containers locally or remotely via SSH, including container operations, logs, monitoring, and cleanup.
Universal Docker MCP server for AI assistants (Cursor, Claude Desktop)
MCP server for Docker CLI integration - 150 tools for containers, images, compose, volumes, networks, cleanup, observability, buildx, manifests, contexts, registry auth, Swarm orchestration, stacks, configs, secrets, content trust, Scout, plugins, and sys
MCP server for executing commands in Docker containers
Manages Docker containers, images, volumes, and Compose services from your IDE.
More in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.