Docker (tmhs) MCP Server
@tmhs/docker-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Source verified
Published by tmhsdigital — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Docker CLI integration - 150 tools for containers, images, compose, volumes, networks, cleanup, observability, buildx, manifests, contexts, registry auth, Swarm orchestration, stacks, configs, secrets, content trust, Scout, plugins, and sys
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "docker_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "docker_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool docker_exec
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/configCreate.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/configCreate.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const inputSchema = { name: z.string().min(1).describe("Config name"), f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/configCreate.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/login.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/login.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const inputSchema = { server: z.string().optional().describe("Registry serve
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/login.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/secretCreate.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/secretCreate.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const inputSchema = { name: z.string().min(1).describe("Secret name"), f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/secretCreate.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/swarmUnlock.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/swarmUnlock.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; const inputSchema = { key: z.string().min(1).describe("Unlock key for the sw
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/swarmUnlock.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/docker-api.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/docker-api.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { DockerError, DockerNotFoundError
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/docker-api.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([docker_containerLogs, docker_serviceLogs]) co-exist with external-action tools ([docker_exec]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [docker_containerLogs, docker_serviceLogs] → sinks [docker_exec]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow docker_containerLogs → docker_exec
low Mutating tool "docker_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "docker_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool docker_exec
Tools 150
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
docker_containerLogsingests untrusted inputdocker_execruns code / shelldocker_serviceLogsingests untrusted inputdocker_buildno sensitive capabilitydocker_builderPruneno sensitive capabilitydocker_buildxBuildno sensitive capabilitydocker_buildxCreateno sensitive capabilitydocker_buildxImagetoolsno sensitive capabilitydocker_buildxInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_buildxLsno sensitive capability
Show 140 more tools ↓
docker_buildxRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_buildxUseno sensitive capabilitydocker_commitno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeBuildno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeConfigno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeCpno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeCreateno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeDownno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeEventsno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeExecno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeImagesno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeKillno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeLogsno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeLsno sensitive capabilitydocker_composePauseno sensitive capabilitydocker_composePortno sensitive capabilitydocker_composePsno sensitive capabilitydocker_composePullno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeRestartno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeRunno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeScaleno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeStartno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeStopno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeTopno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeUnpauseno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeUpno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeVersionno sensitive capabilitydocker_composeWatchno sensitive capabilitydocker_configCreateno sensitive capabilitydocker_configInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_configLsno sensitive capabilitydocker_configRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_containerPruneno sensitive capabilitydocker_contextCreateno sensitive capabilitydocker_contextInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_contextLsno sensitive capabilitydocker_contextRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_contextShowno sensitive capabilitydocker_contextUseno sensitive capabilitydocker_cpno sensitive capabilitydocker_createno sensitive capabilitydocker_diffno sensitive capabilitydocker_diskUsageno sensitive capabilitydocker_eventsno sensitive capabilitydocker_exportno sensitive capabilitydocker_imageHistoryno sensitive capabilitydocker_imagePruneno sensitive capabilitydocker_importno sensitive capabilitydocker_inspectContainerno sensitive capabilitydocker_inspectImageno sensitive capabilitydocker_killno sensitive capabilitydocker_listContainersno sensitive capabilitydocker_listImagesno sensitive capabilitydocker_listNetworksno sensitive capabilitydocker_listVolumesno sensitive capabilitydocker_loadno sensitive capabilitydocker_loginno sensitive capabilitydocker_logoutno sensitive capabilitydocker_manifestAnnotateno sensitive capabilitydocker_manifestCreateno sensitive capabilitydocker_manifestInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_manifestPushno sensitive capabilitydocker_manifestRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_networkConnectno sensitive capabilitydocker_networkCreateno sensitive capabilitydocker_networkDisconnectno sensitive capabilitydocker_networkInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_networkPruneno sensitive capabilitydocker_networkRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_nodeDemoteno sensitive capabilitydocker_nodeInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_nodeLsno sensitive capabilitydocker_nodePromoteno sensitive capabilitydocker_nodePsno sensitive capabilitydocker_nodeRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_nodeUpdateno sensitive capabilitydocker_pauseno sensitive capabilitydocker_pluginEnableno sensitive capabilitydocker_pluginInstallno sensitive capabilitydocker_pluginLsno sensitive capabilitydocker_pluginRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_portno sensitive capabilitydocker_pullno sensitive capabilitydocker_pushno sensitive capabilitydocker_renameno sensitive capabilitydocker_restartno sensitive capabilitydocker_rmno sensitive capabilitydocker_rmino sensitive capabilitydocker_runno sensitive capabilitydocker_saveno sensitive capabilitydocker_scoutCvesno sensitive capabilitydocker_scoutQuickviewno sensitive capabilitydocker_scoutRecommendationsno sensitive capabilitydocker_searchHubno sensitive capabilitydocker_secretCreateno sensitive capabilitydocker_secretInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_secretLsno sensitive capabilitydocker_secretRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_serviceCreateno sensitive capabilitydocker_serviceInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_serviceLsno sensitive capabilitydocker_servicePsno sensitive capabilitydocker_serviceRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_serviceRollbackno sensitive capabilitydocker_serviceScaleno sensitive capabilitydocker_serviceUpdateno sensitive capabilitydocker_stackConfigno sensitive capabilitydocker_stackDeployno sensitive capabilitydocker_stackLsno sensitive capabilitydocker_stackPsno sensitive capabilitydocker_stackRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_stackServicesno sensitive capabilitydocker_startno sensitive capabilitydocker_statsno sensitive capabilitydocker_stopno sensitive capabilitydocker_swarmCano sensitive capabilitydocker_swarmInitno sensitive capabilitydocker_swarmJoinno sensitive capabilitydocker_swarmJoinTokenno sensitive capabilitydocker_swarmLeaveno sensitive capabilitydocker_swarmUnlockno sensitive capabilitydocker_swarmUnlockKeyno sensitive capabilitydocker_swarmUpdateno sensitive capabilitydocker_systemInfono sensitive capabilitydocker_systemPruneno sensitive capabilitydocker_tagno sensitive capabilitydocker_topno sensitive capabilitydocker_trustInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_trustKeyno sensitive capabilitydocker_trustRevokeno sensitive capabilitydocker_trustSignno sensitive capabilitydocker_unpauseno sensitive capabilitydocker_updateno sensitive capabilitydocker_versionno sensitive capabilitydocker_volumeCreateno sensitive capabilitydocker_volumeInspectno sensitive capabilitydocker_volumePruneno sensitive capabilitydocker_volumeRmno sensitive capabilitydocker_waitno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (150 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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