Docker — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@supernova123/docker-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@supernova123/docker-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@supernova123/docker-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (52 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([compose_logs]) and tools that can send data out ([exec_in_container]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "compose_logs → exec_in_container"
},
"evidence": "sources [compose_logs] → sinks [exec_in_container]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"compose_logs"
],
"sinks": [
"exec_in_container"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"exec_in_container\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"exec_in_container\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "exec_in_container"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/compose.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/compose.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/compose.js"
},
"evidence": "exec as execCb } from \"child_process\"; import { existsSync, statSync } from \"fs\"; import { join } from \"path\"; import {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/compose.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/health.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/health.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/health.js"
},
"evidence": "(checks port open), and exec (runs command inside container). Auto-detects probe type from the container's HEALTHCHECK c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/health.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/compose.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/compose.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/compose.ts"
},
"evidence": "exec as execCb } from \"child_process\"; import { existsSync, statSync } from \"fs\"; import { join } from \"path\"; import {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/compose.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/health.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/health.ts:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/health.ts"
},
"evidence": "(checks port open), and exec (runs command inside container). Auto-detects probe type from the container's HEALTHCHECK c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/health.ts",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/compose.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/compose.js:29`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/compose.js"
},
"evidence": "const result = execSync(`docker compose -f \"${filePath}\" ${args.join(\" \")}`, { encoding: \"utf-8\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/compose.js",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/tools/compose.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/compose.ts:39`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/compose.ts"
},
"evidence": "ry { const result = execSync(`docker compose -f \"${filePath}\" ${args.join(\" \")}`, { encoding: \"utf-8\", t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "src/tools/compose.ts",
"line": 39,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"exec_in_container\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"exec_in_container\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "exec_in_container"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/compose.test.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/compose.test.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/compose.test.ts"
},
"evidence": "vi.fn(), })); vi.mock(\"child_process\", () => ({ execSync: mockExecSync, exec: vi.fn(), })); vi.mock(\"fs\", () => ({",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/compose.test.ts",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"compose_logs"
],
"externalSink": [
"exec_in_container"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"compose_logs",
"exec_in_container"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: compose_logs → exec_in_container."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "compose_up",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compose_down",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compose_ps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compose_logs",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_logs\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "compose_restart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_containers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stop_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restart_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recreate_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prune_containers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_contexts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "use_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "exec_in_container",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "check_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "watch_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_restart_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pull_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prune_images",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stream_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "container_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "container_health_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "container_resource_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "watch_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resource_alert_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_networks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_volumes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_login",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "registry_push",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vulnerability_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "docker_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disk_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "copy_from_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "copy_to_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_volume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_volume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_volume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prune_volumes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fleet_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "115276b1179221505c714b5360f5c6ce42b4ab891f50b59fc357b1af9e9124a9",
"stats": {
"tools": 52,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 2,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}