Supergateway MCP Server
supergateway
npm
v3.4.3
Published by supercorp-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Run MCP stdio servers over SSE, Streamable HTTP or visa versa
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/gateways/stdioToSse.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/gateways/stdioToSse.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { Server } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js'; import { SSE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/gateways/stdioToSse.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/gateways/stdioToStatefulStreamableHttp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/gateways/stdioToStatefulStreamableHttp.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { Server } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js'; import { Str
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/gateways/stdioToStatefulStreamableHttp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/gateways/stdioToStatelessStreamableHttp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/gateways/stdioToStatelessStreamableHttp.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { Server } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js'; import { Str
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/gateways/stdioToStatelessStreamableHttp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/gateways/stdioToWs.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/gateways/stdioToWs.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { Server } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js'; import { get
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/gateways/stdioToWs.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/gateways/stdioToSse.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/gateways/stdioToSse.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: houtNullStreams } from 'child_process' import { Server } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js' import { SSESe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/gateways/stdioToSse.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/gateways/stdioToStatefulStreamableHttp.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/gateways/stdioToStatefulStreamableHttp.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process' import { Server } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js' import { Strea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/gateways/stdioToStatefulStreamableHttp.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/gateways/stdioToStatelessStreamableHttp.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/gateways/stdioToStatelessStreamableHttp.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process' import { Server } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js' import { Strea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/gateways/stdioToStatelessStreamableHttp.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/gateways/stdioToWs.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/gateways/stdioToWs.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: houtNullStreams } from 'child_process' import { Server } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js' import { JSONR
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/gateways/stdioToWs.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/baseUrl.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/baseUrl.test.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n, ChildProcess } from 'child_process' const PORT = 11000 const BASE_URL = `http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}` const SSE_PATH = '/
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/baseUrl.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/concurrency.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/concurrency.test.ts:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n, ChildProcess } from 'child_process' import { Client } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js' import { SSECl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/concurrency.test.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.4.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan supergateway --onlineMore in API Development
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