Sudomock MCP Server

@sudomock/mcp npm v2.7.0 Source verified

Published by sudomock — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

SudoMock MCP server for Claude, Cursor, and VS Code. Generate photorealistic product mockups from Photoshop PSD templates.

Trust grade
A
97/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 97/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 97/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([list_jobs]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook_endpoint, update_webhook_endpoint, delete_webhook_endpoint, rotate_webhook_secret, test_webhook_endpoint, replay_webhook_delivery]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [list_jobs] → sinks [create_webhook_endpoint, update_webhook_endpoint, delete_webhook_endpoint, rotate_webhook_secret, test_webhook_endpoint, replay_w

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow list_jobs → create_webhook_endpoint

Tools 28

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_webhook_endpointnetwork egress
  • delete_webhook_endpointnetwork egress
  • list_jobsingests untrusted input
  • replay_webhook_deliverynetwork egress
  • rotate_webhook_secretnetwork egress
  • test_webhook_endpointnetwork egress
  • update_webhook_endpointnetwork egress
  • create_2d_mockupno sensitive capability
  • delete_2d_mockupno sensitive capability
  • delete_mockupno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
  • get_2d_mockupno sensitive capability
  • get_accountno sensitive capability
  • get_jobno sensitive capability
  • get_mockup_detailsno sensitive capability
  • list_2d_mockupsno sensitive capability
  • list_mockupsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhook_deliveriesno sensitive capability
  • list_webhook_endpointsno sensitive capability
  • remove_backgroundno sensitive capability
  • render_2d_print_areano sensitive capability
  • render_2d_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • render_mockupno sensitive capability
  • render_videono sensitive capability
  • update_2d_print_areasno sensitive capability
  • update_mockupno sensitive capability
  • upload_local_fileno sensitive capability
  • upload_psdno sensitive capability
  • wait_for_jobno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 6

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.7.0 latest A 97/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v2.6.0 A 97/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-24
v2.5.0 A 97/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-21
v2.4.0 A 97/100 1 1.12.1 2026-08-04
v2.2.0 A 97/100 1 1.10.0 2026-07-25
Show 1 more version ↓
v2.1.0 A 100/100 0 1.5.0 2026-07-22

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 97/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @sudomock/mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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