Odoo Surface — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@suco/odoo-surface-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@suco/odoo-surface-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@suco/odoo-surface-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 90,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_binary → dump_cache ⇒ post_message. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "download_binary → dump_cache → post_message"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_snippet",
"fetch_and_upload",
"download_binary",
"get_page_arch"
],
"sources": [
"inspect_action",
"dump_cache"
],
"sinks": [
"post_message"
],
"path": [
"download_binary",
"dump_cache",
"post_message"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "download_binary",
"to": "dump_cache",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "dump_cache",
"to": "post_message",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/tools/planning.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/planning.js:46`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/planning.js"
},
"evidence": "func const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(ctx), `return !!(${jsExpr})`); return Boolean(fn(...Object.v",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "dist/tools/planning.js",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/tools/planning.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/planning.ts:58`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/planning.ts"
},
"evidence": "new-func const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(ctx), `return !!(${jsExpr})`); return Boolean(fn(...Object.value",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/tools/planning.ts",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/planning.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/planning.js:46`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/planning.js"
},
"evidence": "func const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(ctx), `return !!(${jsExpr})`); return Boolean(fn(...Object.v",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/tools/planning.js",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/tools/planning.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/planning.ts:58`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/planning.ts"
},
"evidence": "new-func const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(ctx), `return !!(${jsExpr})`); return Boolean(fn(...Object.value",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/tools/planning.ts",
"line": 58,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/smoke-binary.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/smoke-binary.mjs:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/smoke-binary.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFile, readFile, unlink, mkdir } from 'node:fs/promises'; import {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/smoke-binary.mjs",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/smoke-guidance.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/smoke-guidance.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/smoke-guidance.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { dirname, join } from 'node:pa",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/smoke-guidance.mjs",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_snippet",
"fetch_and_upload",
"download_binary",
"get_page_arch"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"inspect_action",
"dump_cache"
],
"externalSink": [
"post_message"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"download_binary",
"dump_cache",
"post_message"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: download_binary → dump_cache ⇒ post_message."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "echo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_view",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_action",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dump_cache",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "clear_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restart_mcp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_model_actions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_model_interface",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_workflows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_workflows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "post_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"post_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "schedule_activity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_available_actions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_records",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_record",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_records",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_fields",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_defaults",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_filters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_snippets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_snippet",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_attachments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_and_upload",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "download_binary",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "upload_binary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "translation_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "translation_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "translation_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_pages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_page_arch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "set_page_arch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_page_visibility",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "6963676f89858d1dfe5c866ca3997a5b66e4cfcc0f48363fd53cd3a1c4bcf129",
"stats": {
"tools": 42,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 4,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}