Odoo Surface MCP Server
@suco/odoo-surface-mcp
npm
v0.5.1
Source verified
Published by solutionsunity — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
User-equivalent Odoo access for AI agents via MCP
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_binary → dump_cache ⇒ post_message. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_binary → dump_cache → post_message
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/tools/planning.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/planning.js:46`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: func const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(ctx), `return !!(${jsExpr})`); return Boolean(fn(...Object.v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/planning.js
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/tools/planning.ts)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/planning.ts:58`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: new-func const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(ctx), `return !!(${jsExpr})`); return Boolean(fn(...Object.value
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/planning.ts
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/planning.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/planning.js:46`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: func const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(ctx), `return !!(${jsExpr})`); return Boolean(fn(...Object.v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/planning.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/tools/planning.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/planning.ts:58`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: new-func const fn = new Function(...Object.keys(ctx), `return !!(${jsExpr})`); return Boolean(fn(...Object.value
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/planning.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/smoke-binary.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/smoke-binary.mjs:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFile, readFile, unlink, mkdir } from 'node:fs/promises'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/smoke-binary.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/smoke-guidance.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/smoke-guidance.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { dirname, join } from 'node:pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/smoke-guidance.mjs
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_binaryingests untrusted inputdump_cachereads sensitive datafetch_and_uploadingests untrusted inputget_page_archingests untrusted inputget_snippetingests untrusted inputinspect_actionreads sensitive datapost_messagenetwork egressarchiveno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilitycreateno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
echono sensitive capabilityexecute_actionno sensitive capabilityfind_skillno sensitive capabilityget_available_actionsno sensitive capabilityget_defaultsno sensitive capabilityget_fieldsno sensitive capabilityget_filtersno sensitive capabilityget_model_actionsno sensitive capabilityget_model_interfaceno sensitive capabilityget_modelsno sensitive capabilityget_recordno sensitive capabilityget_skillsno sensitive capabilityget_workflowsno sensitive capabilityinspect_fieldsno sensitive capabilityinspect_viewno sensitive capabilitylist_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_recordsno sensitive capabilitylist_skillsno sensitive capabilitylist_snippetsno sensitive capabilitylist_workflowsno sensitive capabilitypingno sensitive capabilityrestart_mcpno sensitive capabilityschedule_activityno sensitive capabilitysearch_recordsno sensitive capabilityset_page_archno sensitive capabilityset_page_visibilityno sensitive capabilitytranslation_auditno sensitive capabilitytranslation_getno sensitive capabilitytranslation_updateno sensitive capabilityupdateno sensitive capabilityupload_binaryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.1 latest |
A 90/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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