Stratos — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "stratos-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "stratos-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "stratos-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:3164`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "{ pattern: /(id_rsa|id_dsa|authorized_keys)$/i, category: \"SSH Key\", severity: \"HIGH\" },",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 3164,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/index.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:3498`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ pattern: /(id_rsa|id_dsa|authorized_keys)$/i, category: \"SSH Key\", severity: \"HIGH\" }, { pattern",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/index.ts",
"line": 3498,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5274`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "exec } = await import('child_process'); // First check if account is configured",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 5274,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:5907`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "exec } = await import('child_process'); // First check if account is configured await new Pro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/index.ts",
"line": 5907,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5349`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const child = exec(`kubectl --kubeconfig=\"${tempKubeconfig}\" ${args}`, { maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024, timeout:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 5349,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/index.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:5976`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "const child = exec( `kubectl --kubeconfig=\"${tempKubeconfig}\" ${args}`, { ma",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "src/index.ts",
"line": 5976,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "azure_help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_list_active_locations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_all_locations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_enumerate_subscriptions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_enumerate_resource_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_enumerate_resources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_get_resource_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_storage_security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_nsg_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_enumerate_public_ips",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_enumerate_rbac_assignments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_sql_databases",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_keyvault_security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_cosmosdb_security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_vm_security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_acr_security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_enumerate_service_principals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_enumerate_managed_identities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_container_registry_poisoning",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_storage_containers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_generate_security_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_attack_paths",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_get_aks_credentials",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_azure_devops",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_function_apps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_app_service_security",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_firewall_policies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_logic_apps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_analyze_rbac_privesc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_detect_persistence_mechanisms",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_aks_full",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_aks_live",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_aks_imds",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "azure_scan_aks_pod_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "cda949bd41a6117cf42b4324daa1beb99f06d45c6a7c806d392f9d8d5e07777d",
"stats": {
"tools": 34,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}