Stratos (h4cd0c) MCP Server
stratos-mcp
npm
v1.11.0
Published by h4cd0c — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Stratos - Azure Security Assessment MCP Server - 32 Professional Security Tools (With Annotations & Tests)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 7 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:3164`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { pattern: /(id_rsa|id_dsa|authorized_keys)$/i, category: "SSH Key", severity: "HIGH" },
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:3498`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { pattern: /(id_rsa|id_dsa|authorized_keys)$/i, category: "SSH Key", severity: "HIGH" }, { pattern
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5274`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); // First check if account is configured
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:5907`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); // First check if account is configured await new Pro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5349`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const child = exec(`kubectl --kubeconfig="${tempKubeconfig}" ${args}`, { maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024, timeout:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:5976`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const child = exec( `kubectl --kubeconfig="${tempKubeconfig}" ${args}`, { ma
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
azure_detect_persistence_mechanismsnetwork egressazure_analyze_app_service_securityno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_attack_pathsno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_cosmosdb_securityno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_firewall_policiesno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_function_appsno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_keyvault_securityno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_logic_appsno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_nsg_rulesno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_rbac_privescno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
azure_analyze_storage_securityno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_vm_securityno sensitive capabilityazure_enumerate_managed_identitiesno sensitive capabilityazure_enumerate_public_ipsno sensitive capabilityazure_enumerate_rbac_assignmentsno sensitive capabilityazure_enumerate_resource_groupsno sensitive capabilityazure_enumerate_resourcesno sensitive capabilityazure_enumerate_service_principalsno sensitive capabilityazure_enumerate_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityazure_generate_security_reportno sensitive capabilityazure_get_aks_credentialsno sensitive capabilityazure_get_resource_detailsno sensitive capabilityazure_helpno sensitive capabilityazure_list_active_locationsno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_acr_securityno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_aks_fullno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_aks_imdsno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_aks_liveno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_aks_pod_identityno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_all_locationsno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_azure_devopsno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_container_registry_poisoningno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_sql_databasesno sensitive capabilityazure_scan_storage_containersno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.11.0 latest |
B 84/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan stratos-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Stratos 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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