Storymapper — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "storymapper",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "storymapper"
},
"server": {
"name": "storymapper"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (70 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_revision → attachment_put → test_exec_history. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "get_revision → attachment_put → test_exec_history"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"get_revision"
],
"sources": [
"attachment_put"
],
"sinks": [
"test_exec_start",
"test_exec_record",
"test_exec_set_outcome",
"test_exec_history"
],
"path": [
"get_revision",
"attachment_put",
"test_exec_history"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "get_revision",
"to": "attachment_put",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "attachment_put",
"to": "test_exec_history",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"test_exec_start\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"test_exec_start\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "test_exec_start"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"test_exec_record\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"test_exec_record\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "test_exec_record"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"test_exec_set_outcome\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"test_exec_set_outcome\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "test_exec_set_outcome"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"test_exec_history\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"test_exec_history\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "test_exec_history"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (server/server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`server/server.js:365`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "server/server.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "server/server.js",
"line": 365
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"test_exec_start\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"test_exec_start\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "test_exec_start"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"test_exec_record\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"test_exec_record\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "test_exec_record"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"test_exec_set_outcome\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"test_exec_set_outcome\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "test_exec_set_outcome"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"test_exec_history\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"test_exec_history\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "test_exec_history"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filename\" on \"attachment_put\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"attachment_put\" takes a path parameter \"filename\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "attachment_put",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filename"
},
"data": {
"param": "filename"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"get_revision"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"attachment_put"
],
"externalSink": [
"test_exec_start",
"test_exec_record",
"test_exec_set_outcome",
"test_exec_history"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"get_revision",
"attachment_put",
"test_exec_history"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: get_revision → attachment_put → test_exec_history."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tickets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "next_actionable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_product_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "attachment_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "attachment_put",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"filename\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "attachment_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "attachment_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ingest_slice_candidates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "spec_module_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "requirement_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "requirement_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_trace_coverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_drift_report",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_tickets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ticket_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ticket_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ticket_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ticket_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "change_ticket_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_definitions_for_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_checklist_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_ready",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "complete_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_releases",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "release_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "release_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "release_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_process_steps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "process_step_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "process_step_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "process_step_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "split_process_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reorder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_change_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_ticket_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_link_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_links_for_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_revisions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_revision",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "request_switch_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_def_step_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_def_step_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_def_step_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_def_step_reorder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_def_prereq_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_def_prereq_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_def_prereq_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_def_prereq_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_def_prereq_uncheck",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_exec_start",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "publish_test_definition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "derive_test_definition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reopen_test_definition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_test_definition_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_exec_record",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "test_exec_set_outcome",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "test_exec_history",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "restore_revision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_tickets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "264b871262d4d5ead0b24b2d2117cca88916c1e9d9773aadb313c3052db9aba1",
"stats": {
"tools": 70,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 5,
"medium": 0,
"low": 5,
"info": 0
}
}
}