Storymapper MCP Server
storymapper
npm
v1.0.1
Published by tomatap — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
User Story Map + Kanban board with a live HTTP/WebSocket UI and an MCP server, so AI agents and humans plan the same backlog together.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Tool "test_exec_start" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "test_exec_start" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool test_exec_start
high Tool "test_exec_record" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "test_exec_record" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool test_exec_record
high Tool "test_exec_set_outcome" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "test_exec_set_outcome" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool test_exec_set_outcome
high Tool "test_exec_history" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "test_exec_history" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool test_exec_history
high Shell/command execution in server code (server/server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server/server.js:365`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require("child_process"); const repoRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, ".."); let commit = "unknown",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/server.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_revision]) co-exist with external-action tools ([test_exec_start, test_exec_record, test_exec_set_outcome, test_exec_history]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_revision] → sinks [test_exec_start, test_exec_record, test_exec_set_outcome, test_exec_history]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_revision → test_exec_start
low Mutating tool "test_exec_start" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "test_exec_start" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool test_exec_start
low Mutating tool "test_exec_record" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "test_exec_record" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool test_exec_record
low Mutating tool "test_exec_set_outcome" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "test_exec_set_outcome" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool test_exec_set_outcome
low Mutating tool "test_exec_history" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "test_exec_history" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool test_exec_history
Tools 70
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_revisioningests untrusted inputtest_exec_historyruns code / shelltest_exec_recordruns code / shelltest_exec_set_outcomeruns code / shelltest_exec_startruns code / shellattachment_deleteno sensitive capabilityattachment_getno sensitive capabilityattachment_listno sensitive capabilityattachment_putno sensitive capabilitybulk_change_statusno sensitive capability
Show 60 more tools ↓
bulk_link_createno sensitive capabilitybulk_ticket_updateno sensitive capabilitycancel_ticketno sensitive capabilitychange_ticket_statusno sensitive capabilitycomplete_ticketno sensitive capabilityderive_test_definitionno sensitive capabilityexport_projectno sensitive capabilitygenerate_product_docno sensitive capabilityget_configno sensitive capabilityget_drift_reportno sensitive capabilityget_trace_coverageno sensitive capabilityimport_ticketsno sensitive capabilityingest_slice_candidatesno sensitive capabilitylink_createno sensitive capabilitylink_deleteno sensitive capabilitylist_links_for_ticketno sensitive capabilitylist_process_stepsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_releasesno sensitive capabilitylist_revisionsno sensitive capabilitylist_ticketsno sensitive capabilitymark_readyno sensitive capabilitynext_actionableno sensitive capabilityprocess_step_createno sensitive capabilityprocess_step_deleteno sensitive capabilityprocess_step_updateno sensitive capabilityproject_createno sensitive capabilityproject_deleteno sensitive capabilityproject_getno sensitive capabilityproject_updateno sensitive capabilitypublish_test_definitionno sensitive capabilityquery_ticketsno sensitive capabilityrelease_createno sensitive capabilityrelease_deleteno sensitive capabilityrelease_updateno sensitive capabilityreopen_test_definitionno sensitive capabilityreorderno sensitive capabilityrequest_switch_projectno sensitive capabilityrequirement_createno sensitive capabilityrequirement_listno sensitive capabilityresolve_definitions_for_ticketno sensitive capabilityrestore_revisionno sensitive capabilityset_checklist_itemno sensitive capabilityset_configno sensitive capabilityspec_module_createno sensitive capabilitysplit_process_stepno sensitive capabilitytest_def_prereq_addno sensitive capabilitytest_def_prereq_checkno sensitive capabilitytest_def_prereq_removeno sensitive capabilitytest_def_prereq_uncheckno sensitive capabilitytest_def_prereq_updateno sensitive capabilitytest_def_step_addno sensitive capabilitytest_def_step_removeno sensitive capabilitytest_def_step_reorderno sensitive capabilitytest_def_step_updateno sensitive capabilityticket_createno sensitive capabilityticket_deleteno sensitive capabilityticket_getno sensitive capabilityticket_updateno sensitive capabilityupdate_test_definition_metadatano sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (70 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan storymapper --onlineMore in Productivity & Workflow
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