Say Ur Intent — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "@stelis/say-ur-intent",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@stelis/say-ur-intent"
},
"server": {
"name": "@stelis/say-ur-intent"
}
},
"grade": "F",
"score": {
"score": 57,
"threatScore": 63,
"grade": "F",
"band": "F",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 37.1,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js:3`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js",
"line": 3
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"title": "Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "The implementation builds shell commands out of runtime values AND evaluates runtime values as code. Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code.",
"remediation": "Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "implementation"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rules": [
"MTC-SRC-009",
"MTC-SRC-010"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/review-app/chunk-FPAJGGOC-BhOAtoSQ.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/chunk-FPAJGGOC-BhOAtoSQ.js:12`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/review-app/chunk-FPAJGGOC-BhOAtoSQ.js"
},
"evidence": "Function(`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/review-app/chunk-FPAJGGOC-BhOAtoSQ.js",
"line": 12
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/review-app/cytoscape.esm-CQsWvoXP.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/cytoscape.esm-CQsWvoXP.js:4`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/review-app/cytoscape.esm-CQsWvoXP.js"
},
"evidence": "Function(`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/review-app/cytoscape.esm-CQsWvoXP.js",
"line": 4
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/review-app/identity-CaUpVlB9.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/identity-CaUpVlB9.js:1`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/review-app/identity-CaUpVlB9.js"
},
"evidence": "Function(`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/review-app/identity-CaUpVlB9.js",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js:3`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js",
"line": 3
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/runtime/reviewServerAcquire.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/runtime/reviewServerAcquire.js:89`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/runtime/reviewServerAcquire.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/__identity`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/runtime/reviewServerAcquire.js",
"line": 89
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/core/activity/sqliteActivityStoreSchema.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/activity/sqliteActivityStoreSchema.js:20`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/activity/sqliteActivityStoreSchema.js"
},
"evidence": "exec(`\n CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS accounts (\n id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,\n sui_address TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,\n first_seen_at TEXT NO",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/core/activity/sqliteActivityStoreSchema.js",
"line": 20
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "6944614562dc84d08f9aaab4f70a06719799600ce90b85712457a56a1c7d6f19",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 6,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}