Say Ur Intent MCP Server
@stelis/say-ur-intent
npm
v0.3.0
Source verified
Published by stelis-dev — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 37.1 = 63. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 | injection |
| −15.4 | Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server MTC-SRC-011 | injection |
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 63 − your exposure = 55. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (source) — trust in the source of the package |
| 0 | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js:3`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js
high Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same serverMTC-SRC-011
The implementation builds shell commands out of runtime values AND evaluates runtime values as code. Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code.
Fix: Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.
Location: server implementation
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/review-app/chunk-FPAJGGOC-BhOAtoSQ.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/chunk-FPAJGGOC-BhOAtoSQ.js:12`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Function(`
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/review-app/chunk-FPAJGGOC-BhOAtoSQ.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/review-app/cytoscape.esm-CQsWvoXP.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/cytoscape.esm-CQsWvoXP.js:4`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Function(`
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/review-app/cytoscape.esm-CQsWvoXP.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/review-app/identity-CaUpVlB9.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/identity-CaUpVlB9.js:1`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Function(`
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/review-app/identity-CaUpVlB9.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js:3`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/review-app/walletStatus-BCZgzNU7.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/runtime/reviewServerAcquire.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/runtime/reviewServerAcquire.js:89`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/__identity`
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/runtime/reviewServerAcquire.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/core/activity/sqliteActivityStoreSchema.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/activity/sqliteActivityStoreSchema.js:20`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS accounts (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
sui_address TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
first_seen_at TEXT NO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/activity/sqliteActivityStoreSchema.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
D 63/100 | 8 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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