Statecli MCP Server
statecli-mcp-server
npm
v0.5.0
Published by statecli — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Memory and self-awareness layer for AI agents - MCP server for state tracking, replay, and undo
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auto-tracker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auto-tracker.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Tracker = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const util_1 = require("util"); const execAsync = (0
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auto-tracker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/git-integration.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/git-integration.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: gration = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path = __importStar(require("path")); class Gi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git-integration.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/test-awareness.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/test-awareness.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: areness = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path = __importStar(require("path")); class Te
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/test-awareness.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/semantic-memory.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/semantic-memory.js:71`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n('modulePath', 'return import(modulePath)'); const { pipeline: p } = await dynamicImport('@xenova/transform
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/semantic-memory.js
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
statecli_analyze_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitystatecli_analyze_errorno sensitive capabilitystatecli_auto_recoverno sensitive capabilitystatecli_checkpointno sensitive capabilitystatecli_dependency_treeno sensitive capabilitystatecli_file_historyno sensitive capabilitystatecli_find_circularno sensitive capabilitystatecli_git_checkpointno sensitive capabilitystatecli_git_historyno sensitive capabilitystatecli_git_statusno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
statecli_is_safeno sensitive capabilitystatecli_logno sensitive capabilitystatecli_memory_queryno sensitive capabilitystatecli_predict_impactno sensitive capabilitystatecli_preview_undono sensitive capabilitystatecli_recent_activityno sensitive capabilitystatecli_replayno sensitive capabilitystatecli_run_testsno sensitive capabilitystatecli_safe_change_orderno sensitive capabilitystatecli_safe_executeno sensitive capabilitystatecli_session_infono sensitive capabilitystatecli_simulate_undono sensitive capabilitystatecli_suggest_testsno sensitive capabilitystatecli_test_impactno sensitive capabilitystatecli_trackno sensitive capabilitystatecli_track_fileno sensitive capabilitystatecli_undono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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